To be clear: he thinks talking about how cheap Melnyk is can't change anything.

But he thinks he can stop a global conspiracy.
- Feeling Glucky?

oh i got it. we all got it.

Fort Mac is caused by humans.
- Mapes

http://www.geocraft.com/W...sils/greenhouse_data.html

http://blog.heritage.org/...bution-to-global-warming/

http://www.washingtonpost...1-0204122c514b_story.html

http://www.geocraft.com/WVFossils/greenhouse_data.html

http://blog.heritage.org/...bution-to-global-warming/

http://www.washingtonpost...1-0204122c514b_story.html
- Doppleganger

Bad links.

Bad links.
- Mapes

ty

ty
- the_cause2000

how in the world are supposed to help him save the planet with these broken links?!

- watsonnostaw

I am looking on that sure. Scanned a few 100 panels last night. Only found a few pools and beaches.

There was no "stay with the Ukraine" option on the ballot

And Russian troops had just invaded the area.

...so their options on the ballot were to join Russia, or be an independent nation... filled with Russian troops.
- Feeling Glucky?

The area is already filled with Russians. Russia didnt mandate the referendum either. They did.

They want out and have for a while. Believe it or not, the Ukraine government wasnt exactly a benign one. In any case, not the USAs concern. Stay out of it.

The area is already filled with Russians. Russia didnt mandate the referendum either. They did.

They want out and have for a while. Believe it or not, the Ukraine government wasnt exactly a benign one. In any case, not the USAs concern. Stay out of it.
- TheTaoOfSemenko

before or after the Russians invaded?

A referendum on secession that doesn't include an option for staying with the country can't be seen as legitimate.

Furthermore, Russia put those people there during the days of the USSR. Nobody is forcing those people to stay there. If they want to be part of Russia, they can be part of Russia by moving there.

Lets put it this way- If France flew an army into Quebec, recognized the PQ as the legitimate leaders of the area, and then the PQ said there should be a vote on whether the province would want to be independent or join France... would you say that Canada would just have to accept the result?

edit: and the Ukraine government wants their ally, the US, to help them out if war with Russia breaks out.

before or after the Russians invaded?

A referendum on secession that doesn't include an option for staying with the country can't be seen as legitimate.

Furthermore, Russia put those people there during the days of the USSR. Nobody is forcing those people to stay there. If they want to be part of Russia, they can be part of Russia by moving there.

Lets put it this way- If France flew an army into Quebec, recognized the PQ as the legitimate leaders of the area, and then the PQ said there should be a vote on whether the province would want to be independent or join France... would you say that Canada would just have to accept the result?

edit: and the Ukraine government wants their ally, the US, to help them out if war with Russia breaks out.
- Feeling Glucky?

we're already lobbing a few bombs toward tao's house for anti-american sentiment.

we're already lobbing a few bombs toward tao's house for anti-american sentiment.
- kicksave856

- TheTaoOfSemenko

'MERICA!

APPENDIX: 15 JANUARY 1978

175
Memorandum to the CIA: 15 J
ANUARY
1978

THE LONG-RANGE POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND INTENTIONS OF THE SOVIET LEADERS: AN ASSESSMENT OF AN OFFICIAL REPORT BY A SOVIET EMIGRE IN THE LIGHT OF THE COMMUNIST BLOC'S LONG-RANGE STRATEGY AND ITS DISINFORMATION OFFENSIVE
'At the time of the adoption of the long-range strategy in the period 1958 to 1960, there was strong internal opposition to the Soviet regime from dissatisfied workers, collective farmers, intellectuals, clergy, Ukrainian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Jewish nationalists etc. These oppositionists did not call themselves "dissidents" and nor did the KGB call them "dissidents". On the contrary, the KGB and the Party referred to them as "enemies of the regime."... The KGB was instructed to adopt new methods to deal with this opposi-tion, based on the experience of the GPU (the Soviet political police) under Dzerzhin-skiy in the 1920s... This entailed the creation of a false opposition in the USSR and other coun-tries. .. The current "dissident movement" is just such a false opposition designed and created by the KGB.... The main objectives which the Soviet rulers are trying to achieve through the "dissident movement" are as follows: (a)

To confuse, neutralise and dissolve the true internal political opposition in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; (b)

To prevent the West from reaching the genuine internal opposition in the USSR, by introducing to the West a false KGB-controlled opposition. This explains the easy access of the Western media to the alleged "dissidents"; (c)

To influence the foreign policy of the United States through the "dissi-dents' in the interests of the Communist long-range strategy and exploit this issue in the strategy's final phase '. '... Another significant disinformation theme is the alleged existence of "hidden liberals" in the Party establishment. For example, Aleksey Rumyantsev has been described as a liberal. In fact, he is a hardcore Communist who has always worked in the field of ideology. For a number of years after 1958 he was an editor of the interna-tional Communist journal 'Problems of Peace and Socialism'. Because of his position and experience, he was deeply involved in the devel-opment of the new strategy and deceptive tactics. This explains why he is now being misrepresented as a liberal. A similar case is that of an important official who served as a case officer concerned with the pene-tration of a leading Western intelligence service before, during and after the Second World War, who is now being misrepresented as a liberal in the Party establishment. The scale of disinformation on these lines may be expected to increase and new "defectors" may be expected to provide such disinformation '.

176

THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION '... This analyst has reached the following conclusions about probable devel-opments in the USSR: (a)

One can expect the introduction of economic reforms; which will have similarities to Yugoslav or even Western socialist practice.... (b)

Liberalisation of the Soviet regime on the lines of the Czechoslovak liber-alisation of 1968, including an apparent curtailing of the monopoly of the Communist Party, an apparent separation of the legislative, executive and judicial powers, an increased role for the Soviet parliament, 'reform' of the KGB, an amnesty for "dissi-dents", greater artistic and cultural freedom and freedom to travel, compliance with the Helsinki agreements and the emergence of a younger Party leader to initiate the reforms.... (c)

Similar reforms in Eastern Europe including the return of Dubcek in Czechoslovakia and perhaps the demolition of the Berlin Wall... (d)

The liberalisation will, however, be false and will be aimed at breaking up NATO and dismantling the US "military-industrial complex" in the first instance. The new liberal image will be exploited by East Germany politically and diplomati-cally against West Germany to establish their political confederation... (e)

The deceptive liberalisation will be accepted as genuine and spontaneous and will be blown up out of all proportion by the media... (f)

It may generate pressure for real detente and far-reaching changes in Western societies...'. '... The main objectives of the disinformation which is coming from Brezhnev and his Soviet policymakers are: (a)

To reconfirm for US policymakers the essence of the larger Communist disinformation theme that the Communist Bloc does not exist and that Communist ideology is dead; (b)

To conceal the existing secret coordination between the Communist states and Communist Parties in the non-Communist world in the implementation of their long-range strategy in its final phase; (c)

To reconfirm on this basis to US policymakers the correctness of the US detente with the USSR and the correctness of US support for the Soviet "dissidents" as the viable way to bring about the internal liberalisation of the Soviet regime; and, finally: (d)

To prepare US policymakers psychologically for a favourable response to the false liberalisation when it comes. Since this liberalisation in the USSR will be calculated, false and controlled, the conclusion can be drawn that the main purpose of the disinformation is to influ-ence the US response to the coming false liberalisation in the USSR in the interests of their long-range strategy in the final phase. The arrival of other high-level Soviet "defectors" or "official emigres" can be expected, armed with similar disinformation to influence US foreign policy along these lines'.

APPENDIX: 15 JANUARY 1978

177 '... Over the past fifteen years this analyst, in oral and written reports to the CIA and other Western services, has described various aspects of the Communist Bloc's long-range strategy, the new political role of the KGB and the role of disinfor-mation... The West and its scholars underestimate the gravity of the Communist threat which is more serious than after the Second World War when the United States had a nuclear near-monopoly... Communist ideology is alive again and the Communist world is on the political, economic and diplomatic offensive against the West in the framework of their long-range strategy... All means are used in the battle, legal and illegal; that is why they have resorted to the use of disinformation on an unusually large scale, which throws a completely new light on their detente, on their attempt to change the military balance in their favour and, which is most important of all, on their intentions..'. '... A crisis in US foreign policy has been building up since the adoption of the Communist Bloc's long-range strategy because of the West's inability to understand and interpret the true meaning of events in the Communist world. The crisis is hidden, unrecognised... Now the situation is complicated by the activist approach of the Carter Administration to diplomacy towards the USSR, China and Eastern Europe and in seeking solutions to existing conflicts on the basis of misconceptions. An attempt is being made to bring about liberalisation in the USSR without realising the existence of Communist strategy and disinformation and, for example, the falsity of the KGB-controlled "dissident movement"... In this way, a trap is being laid by the Communist policymakers which will be exploited when the USSR carries out a deceptive liberalisation of its regime...'. '... The problems associated with the new Communist tactics, of the political use of their intelligence potential, their agents of influence and their disinformation, have not been dealt with properly for the last eighteen years, and their priority has not been recognised. The US, British and French counter-intelligence services have been impaired by reorganisation and KGB penetration. Counter-intelligence has a key role to play in understanding and dealing with the new dimensions of the Communist threat, since this entails an analysis of US and other sources of information on Communist developments and of how they might have been compromised by penetration or otherwise exploited by the KGB for disinformation purposes... A special committee or group of qualified and reliable people should be set up by the US Government to study this problem. The project should be approved by the President and should be directly under him. The heads of the Senate Intelligence and Foreign Relations Committees, the Senate and House leaders of both parties and the Attorney General should be told and consulted about this project in advance... A confidential project along these lines was in preparation at this analyst's suggestion under the late French President Pompidou. President Pompidou was a scholar who had read Lenin's and Mao's works and Sun Tzu's treatise on 'The Art of War' which dealt with disinformation and its patterns. When President Pompidou died the project was cancelled. But the point is, if the French could recognise the

178

THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION challenge, why cannot the Americans? No other Western government has the capability to make such a reassessment This analyst wishes to conclude with the request that, if something happens to him, this analysis and his suggestions should be treated as his political will and testa-ment. .. One can ignore the analysis and suggestions for a time but one will be forced by future developments to come back to them and start rethinking the unthinkable, though under less favourable conditions. The Communist challenge and threat will be the major preoccupation of US foreign policy for the years ahead'.

APPENDIX: 15 JANUARY 1978

175
Memorandum to the CIA: 15 J
ANUARY
1978

THE LONG-RANGE POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND INTENTIONS OF THE SOVIET LEADERS: AN ASSESSMENT OF AN OFFICIAL REPORT BY A SOVIET EMIGRE IN THE LIGHT OF THE COMMUNIST BLOC'S LONG-RANGE STRATEGY AND ITS DISINFORMATION OFFENSIVE
'At the time of the adoption of the long-range strategy in the period 1958 to 1960, there was strong internal opposition to the Soviet regime from dissatisfied workers, collective farmers, intellectuals, clergy, Ukrainian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Jewish nationalists etc. These oppositionists did not call themselves "dissidents" and nor did the KGB call them "dissidents". On the contrary, the KGB and the Party referred to them as "enemies of the regime."... The KGB was instructed to adopt new methods to deal with this opposi-tion, based on the experience of the GPU (the Soviet political police) under Dzerzhin-skiy in the 1920s... This entailed the creation of a false opposition in the USSR and other coun-tries. .. The current "dissident movement" is just such a false opposition designed and created by the KGB.... The main objectives which the Soviet rulers are trying to achieve through the "dissident movement" are as follows: (a)

To confuse, neutralise and dissolve the true internal political opposition in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; (b)

To prevent the West from reaching the genuine internal opposition in the USSR, by introducing to the West a false KGB-controlled opposition. This explains the easy access of the Western media to the alleged "dissidents"; (c)

To influence the foreign policy of the United States through the "dissi-dents' in the interests of the Communist long-range strategy and exploit this issue in the strategy's final phase '. '... Another significant disinformation theme is the alleged existence of "hidden liberals" in the Party establishment. For example, Aleksey Rumyantsev has been described as a liberal. In fact, he is a hardcore Communist who has always worked in the field of ideology. For a number of years after 1958 he was an editor of the interna-tional Communist journal 'Problems of Peace and Socialism'. Because of his position and experience, he was deeply involved in the devel-opment of the new strategy and deceptive tactics. This explains why he is now being misrepresented as a liberal. A similar case is that of an important official who served as a case officer concerned with the pene-tration of a leading Western intelligence service before, during and after the Second World War, who is now being misrepresented as a liberal in the Party establishment. The scale of disinformation on these lines may be expected to increase and new "defectors" may be expected to provide such disinformation '.

176

THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION '... This analyst has reached the following conclusions about probable devel-opments in the USSR: (a)

One can expect the introduction of economic reforms; which will have similarities to Yugoslav or even Western socialist practice.... (b)

Liberalisation of the Soviet regime on the lines of the Czechoslovak liber-alisation of 1968, including an apparent curtailing of the monopoly of the Communist Party, an apparent separation of the legislative, executive and judicial powers, an increased role for the Soviet parliament, 'reform' of the KGB, an amnesty for "dissi-dents", greater artistic and cultural freedom and freedom to travel, compliance with the Helsinki agreements and the emergence of a younger Party leader to initiate the reforms.... (c)

Similar reforms in Eastern Europe including the return of Dubcek in Czechoslovakia and perhaps the demolition of the Berlin Wall... (d)

The liberalisation will, however, be false and will be aimed at breaking up NATO and dismantling the US "military-industrial complex" in the first instance. The new liberal image will be exploited by East Germany politically and diplomati-cally against West Germany to establish their political confederation... (e)

The deceptive liberalisation will be accepted as genuine and spontaneous and will be blown up out of all proportion by the media... (f)

It may generate pressure for real detente and far-reaching changes in Western societies...'. '... The main objectives of the disinformation which is coming from Brezhnev and his Soviet policymakers are: (a)

To reconfirm for US policymakers the essence of the larger Communist disinformation theme that the Communist Bloc does not exist and that Communist ideology is dead; (b)

To conceal the existing secret coordination between the Communist states and Communist Parties in the non-Communist world in the implementation of their long-range strategy in its final phase; (c)

To reconfirm on this basis to US policymakers the correctness of the US detente with the USSR and the correctness of US support for the Soviet "dissidents" as the viable way to bring about the internal liberalisation of the Soviet regime; and, finally: (d)

To prepare US policymakers psychologically for a favourable response to the false liberalisation when it comes. Since this liberalisation in the USSR will be calculated, false and controlled, the conclusion can be drawn that the main purpose of the disinformation is to influ-ence the US response to the coming false liberalisation in the USSR in the interests of their long-range strategy in the final phase. The arrival of other high-level Soviet "defectors" or "official emigres" can be expected, armed with similar disinformation to influence US foreign policy along these lines'.

APPENDIX: 15 JANUARY 1978

177 '... Over the past fifteen years this analyst, in oral and written reports to the CIA and other Western services, has described various aspects of the Communist Bloc's long-range strategy, the new political role of the KGB and the role of disinfor-mation... The West and its scholars underestimate the gravity of the Communist threat which is more serious than after the Second World War when the United States had a nuclear near-monopoly... Communist ideology is alive again and the Communist world is on the political, economic and diplomatic offensive against the West in the framework of their long-range strategy... All means are used in the battle, legal and illegal; that is why they have resorted to the use of disinformation on an unusually large scale, which throws a completely new light on their detente, on their attempt to change the military balance in their favour and, which is most important of all, on their intentions..'. '... A crisis in US foreign policy has been building up since the adoption of the Communist Bloc's long-range strategy because of the West's inability to understand and interpret the true meaning of events in the Communist world. The crisis is hidden, unrecognised... Now the situation is complicated by the activist approach of the Carter Administration to diplomacy towards the USSR, China and Eastern Europe and in seeking solutions to existing conflicts on the basis of misconceptions. An attempt is being made to bring about liberalisation in the USSR without realising the existence of Communist strategy and disinformation and, for example, the falsity of the KGB-controlled "dissident movement"... In this way, a trap is being laid by the Communist policymakers which will be exploited when the USSR carries out a deceptive liberalisation of its regime...'. '... The problems associated with the new Communist tactics, of the political use of their intelligence potential, their agents of influence and their disinformation, have not been dealt with properly for the last eighteen years, and their priority has not been recognised. The US, British and French counter-intelligence services have been impaired by reorganisation and KGB penetration. Counter-intelligence has a key role to play in understanding and dealing with the new dimensions of the Communist threat, since this entails an analysis of US and other sources of information on Communist developments and of how they might have been compromised by penetration or otherwise exploited by the KGB for disinformation purposes... A special committee or group of qualified and reliable people should be set up by the US Government to study this problem. The project should be approved by the President and should be directly under him. The heads of the Senate Intelligence and Foreign Relations Committees, the Senate and House leaders of both parties and the Attorney General should be told and consulted about this project in advance... A confidential project along these lines was in preparation at this analyst's suggestion under the late French President Pompidou. President Pompidou was a scholar who had read Lenin's and Mao's works and Sun Tzu's treatise on 'The Art of War' which dealt with disinformation and its patterns. When President Pompidou died the project was cancelled. But the point is, if the French could recognise the

178

THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION challenge, why cannot the Americans? No other Western government has the capability to make such a reassessment This analyst wishes to conclude with the request that, if something happens to him, this analysis and his suggestions should be treated as his political will and testa-ment. .. One can ignore the analysis and suggestions for a time but one will be forced by future developments to come back to them and start rethinking the unthinkable, though under less favourable conditions. The Communist challenge and threat will be the major preoccupation of US foreign policy for the years ahead'.
- Doppleganger

for (frank)s sake man, when you copy and paste, atleast make sure the composition gets pasted correctly, the least you can do is make sure January is one (frank)ing word

for (frank)s sake man, when you copy and paste, atleast make sure the composition gets pasted correctly, the least you can do is make sure January is one (frank)ing word
- watsonnostaw

Why do you insist in always posting
below me?

APPENDIX: 15 JANUARY 1978

175
Memorandum to the CIA: 15 J
ANUARY
1978

THE LONG-RANGE POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND INTENTIONS OF THE SOVIET LEADERS: AN ASSESSMENT OF AN OFFICIAL REPORT BY A SOVIET EMIGRE IN THE LIGHT OF THE COMMUNIST BLOC'S LONG-RANGE STRATEGY AND ITS DISINFORMATION OFFENSIVE
'At the time of the adoption of the long-range strategy in the period 1958 to 1960, there was strong internal opposition to the Soviet regime from dissatisfied workers, collective farmers, intellectuals, clergy, Ukrainian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Jewish nationalists etc. These oppositionists did not call themselves "dissidents" and nor did the KGB call them "dissidents". On the contrary, the KGB and the Party referred to them as "enemies of the regime."... The KGB was instructed to adopt new methods to deal with this opposi-tion, based on the experience of the GPU (the Soviet political police) under Dzerzhin-skiy in the 1920s... This entailed the creation of a false opposition in the USSR and other coun-tries. .. The current "dissident movement" is just such a false opposition designed and created by the KGB.... The main objectives which the Soviet rulers are trying to achieve through the "dissident movement" are as follows: (a)

To confuse, neutralise and dissolve the true internal political opposition in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; (b)

To prevent the West from reaching the genuine internal opposition in the USSR, by introducing to the West a false KGB-controlled opposition. This explains the easy access of the Western media to the alleged "dissidents"; (c)

To influence the foreign policy of the United States through the "dissi-dents' in the interests of the Communist long-range strategy and exploit this issue in the strategy's final phase '. '... Another significant disinformation theme is the alleged existence of "hidden liberals" in the Party establishment. For example, Aleksey Rumyantsev has been described as a liberal. In fact, he is a hardcore Communist who has always worked in the field of ideology. For a number of years after 1958 he was an editor of the interna-tional Communist journal 'Problems of Peace and Socialism'. Because of his position and experience, he was deeply involved in the devel-opment of the new strategy and deceptive tactics. This explains why he is now being misrepresented as a liberal. A similar case is that of an important official who served as a case officer concerned with the pene-tration of a leading Western intelligence service before, during and after the Second World War, who is now being misrepresented as a liberal in the Party establishment. The scale of disinformation on these lines may be expected to increase and new "defectors" may be expected to provide such disinformation '.

176

THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION '... This analyst has reached the following conclusions about probable devel-opments in the USSR: (a)

One can expect the introduction of economic reforms; which will have similarities to Yugoslav or even Western socialist practice.... (b)

Liberalisation of the Soviet regime on the lines of the Czechoslovak liber-alisation of 1968, including an apparent curtailing of the monopoly of the Communist Party, an apparent separation of the legislative, executive and judicial powers, an increased role for the Soviet parliament, 'reform' of the KGB, an amnesty for "dissi-dents", greater artistic and cultural freedom and freedom to travel, compliance with the Helsinki agreements and the emergence of a younger Party leader to initiate the reforms.... (c)

Similar reforms in Eastern Europe including the return of Dubcek in Czechoslovakia and perhaps the demolition of the Berlin Wall... (d)

The liberalisation will, however, be false and will be aimed at breaking up NATO and dismantling the US "military-industrial complex" in the first instance. The new liberal image will be exploited by East Germany politically and diplomati-cally against West Germany to establish their political confederation... (e)

The deceptive liberalisation will be accepted as genuine and spontaneous and will be blown up out of all proportion by the media... (f)

It may generate pressure for real detente and far-reaching changes in Western societies...'. '... The main objectives of the disinformation which is coming from Brezhnev and his Soviet policymakers are: (a)

To reconfirm for US policymakers the essence of the larger Communist disinformation theme that the Communist Bloc does not exist and that Communist ideology is dead; (b)

To conceal the existing secret coordination between the Communist states and Communist Parties in the non-Communist world in the implementation of their long-range strategy in its final phase; (c)

To reconfirm on this basis to US policymakers the correctness of the US detente with the USSR and the correctness of US support for the Soviet "dissidents" as the viable way to bring about the internal liberalisation of the Soviet regime; and, finally: (d)

To prepare US policymakers psychologically for a favourable response to the false liberalisation when it comes. Since this liberalisation in the USSR will be calculated, false and controlled, the conclusion can be drawn that the main purpose of the disinformation is to influ-ence the US response to the coming false liberalisation in the USSR in the interests of their long-range strategy in the final phase. The arrival of other high-level Soviet "defectors" or "official emigres" can be expected, armed with similar disinformation to influence US foreign policy along these lines'.

APPENDIX: 15 JANUARY 1978

177 '... Over the past fifteen years this analyst, in oral and written reports to the CIA and other Western services, has described various aspects of the Communist Bloc's long-range strategy, the new political role of the KGB and the role of disinfor-mation... The West and its scholars underestimate the gravity of the Communist threat which is more serious than after the Second World War when the United States had a nuclear near-monopoly... Communist ideology is alive again and the Communist world is on the political, economic and diplomatic offensive against the West in the framework of their long-range strategy... All means are used in the battle, legal and illegal; that is why they have resorted to the use of disinformation on an unusually large scale, which throws a completely new light on their detente, on their attempt to change the military balance in their favour and, which is most important of all, on their intentions..'. '... A crisis in US foreign policy has been building up since the adoption of the Communist Bloc's long-range strategy because of the West's inability to understand and interpret the true meaning of events in the Communist world. The crisis is hidden, unrecognised... Now the situation is complicated by the activist approach of the Carter Administration to diplomacy towards the USSR, China and Eastern Europe and in seeking solutions to existing conflicts on the basis of misconceptions. An attempt is being made to bring about liberalisation in the USSR without realising the existence of Communist strategy and disinformation and, for example, the falsity of the KGB-controlled "dissident movement"... In this way, a trap is being laid by the Communist policymakers which will be exploited when the USSR carries out a deceptive liberalisation of its regime...'. '... The problems associated with the new Communist tactics, of the political use of their intelligence potential, their agents of influence and their disinformation, have not been dealt with properly for the last eighteen years, and their priority has not been recognised. The US, British and French counter-intelligence services have been impaired by reorganisation and KGB penetration. Counter-intelligence has a key role to play in understanding and dealing with the new dimensions of the Communist threat, since this entails an analysis of US and other sources of information on Communist developments and of how they might have been compromised by penetration or otherwise exploited by the KGB for disinformation purposes... A special committee or group of qualified and reliable people should be set up by the US Government to study this problem. The project should be approved by the President and should be directly under him. The heads of the Senate Intelligence and Foreign Relations Committees, the Senate and House leaders of both parties and the Attorney General should be told and consulted about this project in advance... A confidential project along these lines was in preparation at this analyst's suggestion under the late French President Pompidou. President Pompidou was a scholar who had read Lenin's and Mao's works and Sun Tzu's treatise on 'The Art of War' which dealt with disinformation and its patterns. When President Pompidou died the project was cancelled. But the point is, if the French could recognise the

178

THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION challenge, why cannot the Americans? No other Western government has the capability to make such a reassessment This analyst wishes to conclude with the request that, if something happens to him, this analysis and his suggestions should be treated as his political will and testa-ment. .. One can ignore the analysis and suggestions for a time but one will be forced by future developments to come back to them and start rethinking the unthinkable, though under less favourable conditions. The Communist challenge and threat will be the major preoccupation of US foreign policy for the years ahead'.
- Doppleganger

APPENDIX: 15 JANUARY 1978

175
Memorandum to the CIA: 15 J
ANUARY
1978

THE LONG-RANGE POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND INTENTIONS OF THE SOVIET LEADERS: AN ASSESSMENT OF AN OFFICIAL REPORT BY A SOVIET EMIGRE IN THE LIGHT OF THE COMMUNIST BLOC'S LONG-RANGE STRATEGY AND ITS DISINFORMATION OFFENSIVE
'At the time of the adoption of the long-range strategy in the period 1958 to 1960, there was strong internal opposition to the Soviet regime from dissatisfied workers, collective farmers, intellectuals, clergy, Ukrainian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Jewish nationalists etc. These oppositionists did not call themselves "dissidents" and nor did the KGB call them "dissidents". On the contrary, the KGB and the Party referred to them as "enemies of the regime."... The KGB was instructed to adopt new methods to deal with this opposi-tion, based on the experience of the GPU (the Soviet political police) under Dzerzhin-skiy in the 1920s... This entailed the creation of a false opposition in the USSR and other coun-tries. .. The current "dissident movement" is just such a false opposition designed and created by the KGB.... The main objectives which the Soviet rulers are trying to achieve through the "dissident movement" are as follows: (a)

To confuse, neutralise and dissolve the true internal political opposition in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; (b)

To prevent the West from reaching the genuine internal opposition in the USSR, by introducing to the West a false KGB-controlled opposition. This explains the easy access of the Western media to the alleged "dissidents"; (c)

To influence the foreign policy of the United States through the "dissi-dents' in the interests of the Communist long-range strategy and exploit this issue in the strategy's final phase '. '... Another significant disinformation theme is the alleged existence of "hidden liberals" in the Party establishment. For example, Aleksey Rumyantsev has been described as a liberal. In fact, he is a hardcore Communist who has always worked in the field of ideology. For a number of years after 1958 he was an editor of the interna-tional Communist journal 'Problems of Peace and Socialism'. Because of his position and experience, he was deeply involved in the devel-opment of the new strategy and deceptive tactics. This explains why he is now being misrepresented as a liberal. A similar case is that of an important official who served as a case officer concerned with the pene-tration of a leading Western intelligence service before, during and after the Second World War, who is now being misrepresented as a liberal in the Party establishment. The scale of disinformation on these lines may be expected to increase and new "defectors" may be expected to provide such disinformation '.

176

THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION '... This analyst has reached the following conclusions about probable devel-opments in the USSR: (a)

One can expect the introduction of economic reforms; which will have similarities to Yugoslav or even Western socialist practice.... (b)

Liberalisation of the Soviet regime on the lines of the Czechoslovak liber-alisation of 1968, including an apparent curtailing of the monopoly of the Communist Party, an apparent separation of the legislative, executive and judicial powers, an increased role for the Soviet parliament, 'reform' of the KGB, an amnesty for "dissi-dents", greater artistic and cultural freedom and freedom to travel, compliance with the Helsinki agreements and the emergence of a younger Party leader to initiate the reforms.... (c)

Similar reforms in Eastern Europe including the return of Dubcek in Czechoslovakia and perhaps the demolition of the Berlin Wall... (d)

The liberalisation will, however, be false and will be aimed at breaking up NATO and dismantling the US "military-industrial complex" in the first instance. The new liberal image will be exploited by East Germany politically and diplomati-cally against West Germany to establish their political confederation... (e)

The deceptive liberalisation will be accepted as genuine and spontaneous and will be blown up out of all proportion by the media... (f)

It may generate pressure for real detente and far-reaching changes in Western societies...'. '... The main objectives of the disinformation which is coming from Brezhnev and his Soviet policymakers are: (a)

To reconfirm for US policymakers the essence of the larger Communist disinformation theme that the Communist Bloc does not exist and that Communist ideology is dead; (b)

To conceal the existing secret coordination between the Communist states and Communist Parties in the non-Communist world in the implementation of their long-range strategy in its final phase; (c)

To reconfirm on this basis to US policymakers the correctness of the US detente with the USSR and the correctness of US support for the Soviet "dissidents" as the viable way to bring about the internal liberalisation of the Soviet regime; and, finally: (d)

To prepare US policymakers psychologically for a favourable response to the false liberalisation when it comes. Since this liberalisation in the USSR will be calculated, false and controlled, the conclusion can be drawn that the main purpose of the disinformation is to influ-ence the US response to the coming false liberalisation in the USSR in the interests of their long-range strategy in the final phase. The arrival of other high-level Soviet "defectors" or "official emigres" can be expected, armed with similar disinformation to influence US foreign policy along these lines'.

APPENDIX: 15 JANUARY 1978

177 '... Over the past fifteen years this analyst, in oral and written reports to the CIA and other Western services, has described various aspects of the Communist Bloc's long-range strategy, the new political role of the KGB and the role of disinfor-mation... The West and its scholars underestimate the gravity of the Communist threat which is more serious than after the Second World War when the United States had a nuclear near-monopoly... Communist ideology is alive again and the Communist world is on the political, economic and diplomatic offensive against the West in the framework of their long-range strategy... All means are used in the battle, legal and illegal; that is why they have resorted to the use of disinformation on an unusually large scale, which throws a completely new light on their detente, on their attempt to change the military balance in their favour and, which is most important of all, on their intentions..'. '... A crisis in US foreign policy has been building up since the adoption of the Communist Bloc's long-range strategy because of the West's inability to understand and interpret the true meaning of events in the Communist world. The crisis is hidden, unrecognised... Now the situation is complicated by the activist approach of the Carter Administration to diplomacy towards the USSR, China and Eastern Europe and in seeking solutions to existing conflicts on the basis of misconceptions. An attempt is being made to bring about liberalisation in the USSR without realising the existence of Communist strategy and disinformation and, for example, the falsity of the KGB-controlled "dissident movement"... In this way, a trap is being laid by the Communist policymakers which will be exploited when the USSR carries out a deceptive liberalisation of its regime...'. '... The problems associated with the new Communist tactics, of the political use of their intelligence potential, their agents of influence and their disinformation, have not been dealt with properly for the last eighteen years, and their priority has not been recognised. The US, British and French counter-intelligence services have been impaired by reorganisation and KGB penetration. Counter-intelligence has a key role to play in understanding and dealing with the new dimensions of the Communist threat, since this entails an analysis of US and other sources of information on Communist developments and of how they might have been compromised by penetration or otherwise exploited by the KGB for disinformation purposes... A special committee or group of qualified and reliable people should be set up by the US Government to study this problem. The project should be approved by the President and should be directly under him. The heads of the Senate Intelligence and Foreign Relations Committees, the Senate and House leaders of both parties and the Attorney General should be told and consulted about this project in advance... A confidential project along these lines was in preparation at this analyst's suggestion under the late French President Pompidou. President Pompidou was a scholar who had read Lenin's and Mao's works and Sun Tzu's treatise on 'The Art of War' which dealt with disinformation and its patterns. When President Pompidou died the project was cancelled. But the point is, if the French could recognise the

178

THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION challenge, why cannot the Americans? No other Western government has the capability to make such a reassessment This analyst wishes to conclude with the request that, if something happens to him, this analysis and his suggestions should be treated as his political will and testa-ment. .. One can ignore the analysis and suggestions for a time but one will be forced by future developments to come back to them and start rethinking the unthinkable, though under less favourable conditions. The Communist challenge and threat will be the major preoccupation of US foreign policy for the years ahead'.
- Doppleganger

APPENDIX: 15 JANUARY 1978

175
Memorandum to the CIA: 15 J
ANUARY
1978

THE LONG-RANGE POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND INTENTIONS OF THE SOVIET LEADERS: AN ASSESSMENT OF AN OFFICIAL REPORT BY A SOVIET EMIGRE IN THE LIGHT OF THE COMMUNIST BLOC'S LONG-RANGE STRATEGY AND ITS DISINFORMATION OFFENSIVE
'At the time of the adoption of the long-range strategy in the period 1958 to 1960, there was strong internal opposition to the Soviet regime from dissatisfied workers, collective farmers, intellectuals, clergy, Ukrainian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Jewish nationalists etc. These oppositionists did not call themselves "dissidents" and nor did the KGB call them "dissidents". On the contrary, the KGB and the Party referred to them as "enemies of the regime."... The KGB was instructed to adopt new methods to deal with this opposi-tion, based on the experience of the GPU (the Soviet political police) under Dzerzhin-skiy in the 1920s... This entailed the creation of a false opposition in the USSR and other coun-tries. .. The current "dissident movement" is just such a false opposition designed and created by the KGB.... The main objectives which the Soviet rulers are trying to achieve through the "dissident movement" are as follows: (a)

To confuse, neutralise and dissolve the true internal political opposition in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; (b)

To prevent the West from reaching the genuine internal opposition in the USSR, by introducing to the West a false KGB-controlled opposition. This explains the easy access of the Western media to the alleged "dissidents"; (c)

To influence the foreign policy of the United States through the "dissi-dents' in the interests of the Communist long-range strategy and exploit this issue in the strategy's final phase '. '... Another significant disinformation theme is the alleged existence of "hidden liberals" in the Party establishment. For example, Aleksey Rumyantsev has been described as a liberal. In fact, he is a hardcore Communist who has always worked in the field of ideology. For a number of years after 1958 he was an editor of the interna-tional Communist journal 'Problems of Peace and Socialism'. Because of his position and experience, he was deeply involved in the devel-opment of the new strategy and deceptive tactics. This explains why he is now being misrepresented as a liberal. A similar case is that of an important official who served as a case officer concerned with the pene-tration of a leading Western intelligence service before, during and after the Second World War, who is now being misrepresented as a liberal in the Party establishment. The scale of disinformation on these lines may be expected to increase and new "defectors" may be expected to provide such disinformation '.

176

THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION '... This analyst has reached the following conclusions about probable devel-opments in the USSR: (a)

One can expect the introduction of economic reforms; which will have similarities to Yugoslav or even Western socialist practice.... (b)

Liberalisation of the Soviet regime on the lines of the Czechoslovak liber-alisation of 1968, including an apparent curtailing of the monopoly of the Communist Party, an apparent separation of the legislative, executive and judicial powers, an increased role for the Soviet parliament, 'reform' of the KGB, an amnesty for "dissi-dents", greater artistic and cultural freedom and freedom to travel, compliance with the Helsinki agreements and the emergence of a younger Party leader to initiate the reforms.... (c)

Similar reforms in Eastern Europe including the return of Dubcek in Czechoslovakia and perhaps the demolition of the Berlin Wall... (d)

The liberalisation will, however, be false and will be aimed at breaking up NATO and dismantling the US "military-industrial complex" in the first instance. The new liberal image will be exploited by East Germany politically and diplomati-cally against West Germany to establish their political confederation... (e)

The deceptive liberalisation will be accepted as genuine and spontaneous and will be blown up out of all proportion by the media... (f)

It may generate pressure for real detente and far-reaching changes in Western societies...'. '... The main objectives of the disinformation which is coming from Brezhnev and his Soviet policymakers are: (a)

To reconfirm for US policymakers the essence of the larger Communist disinformation theme that the Communist Bloc does not exist and that Communist ideology is dead; (b)

To conceal the existing secret coordination between the Communist states and Communist Parties in the non-Communist world in the implementation of their long-range strategy in its final phase; (c)

To reconfirm on this basis to US policymakers the correctness of the US detente with the USSR and the correctness of US support for the Soviet "dissidents" as the viable way to bring about the internal liberalisation of the Soviet regime; and, finally: (d)

To prepare US policymakers psychologically for a favourable response to the false liberalisation when it comes. Since this liberalisation in the USSR will be calculated, false and controlled, the conclusion can be drawn that the main purpose of the disinformation is to influ-ence the US response to the coming false liberalisation in the USSR in the interests of their long-range strategy in the final phase. The arrival of other high-level Soviet "defectors" or "official emigres" can be expected, armed with similar disinformation to influence US foreign policy along these lines'.

APPENDIX: 15 JANUARY 1978

177 '... Over the past fifteen years this analyst, in oral and written reports to the CIA and other Western services, has described various aspects of the Communist Bloc's long-range strategy, the new political role of the KGB and the role of disinfor-mation... The West and its scholars underestimate the gravity of the Communist threat which is more serious than after the Second World War when the United States had a nuclear near-monopoly... Communist ideology is alive again and the Communist world is on the political, economic and diplomatic offensive against the West in the framework of their long-range strategy... All means are used in the battle, legal and illegal; that is why they have resorted to the use of disinformation on an unusually large scale, which throws a completely new light on their detente, on their attempt to change the military balance in their favour and, which is most important of all, on their intentions..'. '... A crisis in US foreign policy has been building up since the adoption of the Communist Bloc's long-range strategy because of the West's inability to understand and interpret the true meaning of events in the Communist world. The crisis is hidden, unrecognised... Now the situation is complicated by the activist approach of the Carter Administration to diplomacy towards the USSR, China and Eastern Europe and in seeking solutions to existing conflicts on the basis of misconceptions. An attempt is being made to bring about liberalisation in the USSR without realising the existence of Communist strategy and disinformation and, for example, the falsity of the KGB-controlled "dissident movement"... In this way, a trap is being laid by the Communist policymakers which will be exploited when the USSR carries out a deceptive liberalisation of its regime...'. '... The problems associated with the new Communist tactics, of the political use of their intelligence potential, their agents of influence and their disinformation, have not been dealt with properly for the last eighteen years, and their priority has not been recognised. The US, British and French counter-intelligence services have been impaired by reorganisation and KGB penetration. Counter-intelligence has a key role to play in understanding and dealing with the new dimensions of the Communist threat, since this entails an analysis of US and other sources of information on Communist developments and of how they might have been compromised by penetration or otherwise exploited by the KGB for disinformation purposes... A special committee or group of qualified and reliable people should be set up by the US Government to study this problem. The project should be approved by the President and should be directly under him. The heads of the Senate Intelligence and Foreign Relations Committees, the Senate and House leaders of both parties and the Attorney General should be told and consulted about this project in advance... A confidential project along these lines was in preparation at this analyst's suggestion under the late French President Pompidou. President Pompidou was a scholar who had read Lenin's and Mao's works and Sun Tzu's treatise on 'The Art of War' which dealt with disinformation and its patterns. When President Pompidou died the project was cancelled. But the point is, if the French could recognise the

178

THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION challenge, why cannot the Americans? No other Western government has the capability to make such a reassessment This analyst wishes to conclude with the request that, if something happens to him, this analysis and his suggestions should be treated as his political will and testa-ment. .. One can ignore the analysis and suggestions for a time but one will be forced by future developments to come back to them and start rethinking the unthinkable, though under less favourable conditions. The Communist challenge and threat will be the major preoccupation of US foreign policy for the years ahead'.
- Doppleganger

APPENDIX: 15 JANUARY 1978

175
Memorandum to the CIA: 15 J
ANUARY
1978

THE LONG-RANGE POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND INTENTIONS OF THE SOVIET LEADERS: AN ASSESSMENT OF AN OFFICIAL REPORT BY A SOVIET EMIGRE IN THE LIGHT OF THE COMMUNIST BLOC'S LONG-RANGE STRATEGY AND ITS DISINFORMATION OFFENSIVE
'At the time of the adoption of the long-range strategy in the period 1958 to 1960, there was strong internal opposition to the Soviet regime from dissatisfied workers, collective farmers, intellectuals, clergy, Ukrainian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Jewish nationalists etc. These oppositionists did not call themselves "dissidents" and nor did the KGB call them "dissidents". On the contrary, the KGB and the Party referred to them as "enemies of the regime."... The KGB was instructed to adopt new methods to deal with this opposi-tion, based on the experience of the GPU (the Soviet political police) under Dzerzhin-skiy in the 1920s... This entailed the creation of a false opposition in the USSR and other coun-tries. .. The current "dissident movement" is just such a false opposition designed and created by the KGB.... The main objectives which the Soviet rulers are trying to achieve through the "dissident movement" are as follows: (a)

To confuse, neutralise and dissolve the true internal political opposition in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; (b)

To prevent the West from reaching the genuine internal opposition in the USSR, by introducing to the West a false KGB-controlled opposition. This explains the easy access of the Western media to the alleged "dissidents"; (c)

To influence the foreign policy of the United States through the "dissi-dents' in the interests of the Communist long-range strategy and exploit this issue in the strategy's final phase '. '... Another significant disinformation theme is the alleged existence of "hidden liberals" in the Party establishment. For example, Aleksey Rumyantsev has been described as a liberal. In fact, he is a hardcore Communist who has always worked in the field of ideology. For a number of years after 1958 he was an editor of the interna-tional Communist journal 'Problems of Peace and Socialism'. Because of his position and experience, he was deeply involved in the devel-opment of the new strategy and deceptive tactics. This explains why he is now being misrepresented as a liberal. A similar case is that of an important official who served as a case officer concerned with the pene-tration of a leading Western intelligence service before, during and after the Second World War, who is now being misrepresented as a liberal in the Party establishment. The scale of disinformation on these lines may be expected to increase and new "defectors" may be expected to provide such disinformation '.

176

THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION '... This analyst has reached the following conclusions about probable devel-opments in the USSR: (a)

One can expect the introduction of economic reforms; which will have similarities to Yugoslav or even Western socialist practice.... (b)

Liberalisation of the Soviet regime on the lines of the Czechoslovak liber-alisation of 1968, including an apparent curtailing of the monopoly of the Communist Party, an apparent separation of the legislative, executive and judicial powers, an increased role for the Soviet parliament, 'reform' of the KGB, an amnesty for "dissi-dents", greater artistic and cultural freedom and freedom to travel, compliance with the Helsinki agreements and the emergence of a younger Party leader to initiate the reforms.... (c)

Similar reforms in Eastern Europe including the return of Dubcek in Czechoslovakia and perhaps the demolition of the Berlin Wall... (d)

The liberalisation will, however, be false and will be aimed at breaking up NATO and dismantling the US "military-industrial complex" in the first instance. The new liberal image will be exploited by East Germany politically and diplomati-cally against West Germany to establish their political confederation... (e)

The deceptive liberalisation will be accepted as genuine and spontaneous and will be blown up out of all proportion by the media... (f)

It may generate pressure for real detente and far-reaching changes in Western societies...'. '... The main objectives of the disinformation which is coming from Brezhnev and his Soviet policymakers are: (a)

To reconfirm for US policymakers the essence of the larger Communist disinformation theme that the Communist Bloc does not exist and that Communist ideology is dead; (b)

To conceal the existing secret coordination between the Communist states and Communist Parties in the non-Communist world in the implementation of their long-range strategy in its final phase; (c)

To reconfirm on this basis to US policymakers the correctness of the US detente with the USSR and the correctness of US support for the Soviet "dissidents" as the viable way to bring about the internal liberalisation of the Soviet regime; and, finally: (d)

To prepare US policymakers psychologically for a favourable response to the false liberalisation when it comes. Since this liberalisation in the USSR will be calculated, false and controlled, the conclusion can be drawn that the main purpose of the disinformation is to influ-ence the US response to the coming false liberalisation in the USSR in the interests of their long-range strategy in the final phase. The arrival of other high-level Soviet "defectors" or "official emigres" can be expected, armed with similar disinformation to influence US foreign policy along these lines'.

APPENDIX: 15 JANUARY 1978

177 '... Over the past fifteen years this analyst, in oral and written reports to the CIA and other Western services, has described various aspects of the Communist Bloc's long-range strategy, the new political role of the KGB and the role of disinfor-mation... The West and its scholars underestimate the gravity of the Communist threat which is more serious than after the Second World War when the United States had a nuclear near-monopoly... Communist ideology is alive again and the Communist world is on the political, economic and diplomatic offensive against the West in the framework of their long-range strategy... All means are used in the battle, legal and illegal; that is why they have resorted to the use of disinformation on an unusually large scale, which throws a completely new light on their detente, on their attempt to change the military balance in their favour and, which is most important of all, on their intentions..'. '... A crisis in US foreign policy has been building up since the adoption of the Communist Bloc's long-range strategy because of the West's inability to understand and interpret the true meaning of events in the Communist world. The crisis is hidden, unrecognised... Now the situation is complicated by the activist approach of the Carter Administration to diplomacy towards the USSR, China and Eastern Europe and in seeking solutions to existing conflicts on the basis of misconceptions. An attempt is being made to bring about liberalisation in the USSR without realising the existence of Communist strategy and disinformation and, for example, the falsity of the KGB-controlled "dissident movement"... In this way, a trap is being laid by the Communist policymakers which will be exploited when the USSR carries out a deceptive liberalisation of its regime...'. '... The problems associated with the new Communist tactics, of the political use of their intelligence potential, their agents of influence and their disinformation, have not been dealt with properly for the last eighteen years, and their priority has not been recognised. The US, British and French counter-intelligence services have been impaired by reorganisation and KGB penetration. Counter-intelligence has a key role to play in understanding and dealing with the new dimensions of the Communist threat, since this entails an analysis of US and other sources of information on Communist developments and of how they might have been compromised by penetration or otherwise exploited by the KGB for disinformation purposes... A special committee or group of qualified and reliable people should be set up by the US Government to study this problem. The project should be approved by the President and should be directly under him. The heads of the Senate Intelligence and Foreign Relations Committees, the Senate and House leaders of both parties and the Attorney General should be told and consulted about this project in advance... A confidential project along these lines was in preparation at this analyst's suggestion under the late French President Pompidou. President Pompidou was a scholar who had read Lenin's and Mao's works and Sun Tzu's treatise on 'The Art of War' which dealt with disinformation and its patterns. When President Pompidou died the project was cancelled. But the point is, if the French could recognise the

178

THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION challenge, why cannot the Americans? No other Western government has the capability to make such a reassessment This analyst wishes to conclude with the request that, if something happens to him, this analysis and his suggestions should be treated as his political will and testa-ment. .. One can ignore the analysis and suggestions for a time but one will be forced by future developments to come back to them and start rethinking the unthinkable, though under less favourable conditions. The Communist challenge and threat will be the major preoccupation of US foreign policy for the years ahead'.
- Doppleganger

APPENDIX: 15 JANUARY 1978

175
Memorandum to the CIA: 15 J
ANUARY
1978

THE LONG-RANGE POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND INTENTIONS OF THE SOVIET LEADERS: AN ASSESSMENT OF AN OFFICIAL REPORT BY A SOVIET EMIGRE IN THE LIGHT OF THE COMMUNIST BLOC'S LONG-RANGE STRATEGY AND ITS DISINFORMATION OFFENSIVE
'At the time of the adoption of the long-range strategy in the period 1958 to 1960, there was strong internal opposition to the Soviet regime from dissatisfied workers, collective farmers, intellectuals, clergy, Ukrainian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Jewish nationalists etc. These oppositionists did not call themselves "dissidents" and nor did the KGB call them "dissidents". On the contrary, the KGB and the Party referred to them as "enemies of the regime."... The KGB was instructed to adopt new methods to deal with this opposi-tion, based on the experience of the GPU (the Soviet political police) under Dzerzhin-skiy in the 1920s... This entailed the creation of a false opposition in the USSR and other coun-tries. .. The current "dissident movement" is just such a false opposition designed and created by the KGB.... The main objectives which the Soviet rulers are trying to achieve through the "dissident movement" are as follows: (a)

To confuse, neutralise and dissolve the true internal political opposition in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; (b)

To prevent the West from reaching the genuine internal opposition in the USSR, by introducing to the West a false KGB-controlled opposition. This explains the easy access of the Western media to the alleged "dissidents"; (c)

To influence the foreign policy of the United States through the "dissi-dents' in the interests of the Communist long-range strategy and exploit this issue in the strategy's final phase '. '... Another significant disinformation theme is the alleged existence of "hidden liberals" in the Party establishment. For example, Aleksey Rumyantsev has been described as a liberal. In fact, he is a hardcore Communist who has always worked in the field of ideology. For a number of years after 1958 he was an editor of the interna-tional Communist journal 'Problems of Peace and Socialism'. Because of his position and experience, he was deeply involved in the devel-opment of the new strategy and deceptive tactics. This explains why he is now being misrepresented as a liberal. A similar case is that of an important official who served as a case officer concerned with the pene-tration of a leading Western intelligence service before, during and after the Second World War, who is now being misrepresented as a liberal in the Party establishment. The scale of disinformation on these lines may be expected to increase and new "defectors" may be expected to provide such disinformation '.

176

THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION '... This analyst has reached the following conclusions about probable devel-opments in the USSR: (a)

One can expect the introduction of economic reforms; which will have similarities to Yugoslav or even Western socialist practice.... (b)

Liberalisation of the Soviet regime on the lines of the Czechoslovak liber-alisation of 1968, including an apparent curtailing of the monopoly of the Communist Party, an apparent separation of the legislative, executive and judicial powers, an increased role for the Soviet parliament, 'reform' of the KGB, an amnesty for "dissi-dents", greater artistic and cultural freedom and freedom to travel, compliance with the Helsinki agreements and the emergence of a younger Party leader to initiate the reforms.... (c)

Similar reforms in Eastern Europe including the return of Dubcek in Czechoslovakia and perhaps the demolition of the Berlin Wall... (d)

The liberalisation will, however, be false and will be aimed at breaking up NATO and dismantling the US "military-industrial complex" in the first instance. The new liberal image will be exploited by East Germany politically and diplomati-cally against West Germany to establish their political confederation... (e)

The deceptive liberalisation will be accepted as genuine and spontaneous and will be blown up out of all proportion by the media... (f)

It may generate pressure for real detente and far-reaching changes in Western societies...'. '... The main objectives of the disinformation which is coming from Brezhnev and his Soviet policymakers are: (a)

To reconfirm for US policymakers the essence of the larger Communist disinformation theme that the Communist Bloc does not exist and that Communist ideology is dead; (b)

To conceal the existing secret coordination between the Communist states and Communist Parties in the non-Communist world in the implementation of their long-range strategy in its final phase; (c)

To reconfirm on this basis to US policymakers the correctness of the US detente with the USSR and the correctness of US support for the Soviet "dissidents" as the viable way to bring about the internal liberalisation of the Soviet regime; and, finally: (d)

To prepare US policymakers psychologically for a favourable response to the false liberalisation when it comes. Since this liberalisation in the USSR will be calculated, false and controlled, the conclusion can be drawn that the main purpose of the disinformation is to influ-ence the US response to the coming false liberalisation in the USSR in the interests of their long-range strategy in the final phase. The arrival of other high-level Soviet "defectors" or "official emigres" can be expected, armed with similar disinformation to influence US foreign policy along these lines'.

APPENDIX: 15 JANUARY 1978

177 '... Over the past fifteen years this analyst, in oral and written reports to the CIA and other Western services, has described various aspects of the Communist Bloc's long-range strategy, the new political role of the KGB and the role of disinfor-mation... The West and its scholars underestimate the gravity of the Communist threat which is more serious than after the Second World War when the United States had a nuclear near-monopoly... Communist ideology is alive again and the Communist world is on the political, economic and diplomatic offensive against the West in the framework of their long-range strategy... All means are used in the battle, legal and illegal; that is why they have resorted to the use of disinformation on an unusually large scale, which throws a completely new light on their detente, on their attempt to change the military balance in their favour and, which is most important of all, on their intentions..'. '... A crisis in US foreign policy has been building up since the adoption of the Communist Bloc's long-range strategy because of the West's inability to understand and interpret the true meaning of events in the Communist world. The crisis is hidden, unrecognised... Now the situation is complicated by the activist approach of the Carter Administration to diplomacy towards the USSR, China and Eastern Europe and in seeking solutions to existing conflicts on the basis of misconceptions. An attempt is being made to bring about liberalisation in the USSR without realising the existence of Communist strategy and disinformation and, for example, the falsity of the KGB-controlled "dissident movement"... In this way, a trap is being laid by the Communist policymakers which will be exploited when the USSR carries out a deceptive liberalisation of its regime...'. '... The problems associated with the new Communist tactics, of the political use of their intelligence potential, their agents of influence and their disinformation, have not been dealt with properly for the last eighteen years, and their priority has not been recognised. The US, British and French counter-intelligence services have been impaired by reorganisation and KGB penetration. Counter-intelligence has a key role to play in understanding and dealing with the new dimensions of the Communist threat, since this entails an analysis of US and other sources of information on Communist developments and of how they might have been compromised by penetration or otherwise exploited by the KGB for disinformation purposes... A special committee or group of qualified and reliable people should be set up by the US Government to study this problem. The project should be approved by the President and should be directly under him. The heads of the Senate Intelligence and Foreign Relations Committees, the Senate and House leaders of both parties and the Attorney General should be told and consulted about this project in advance... A confidential project along these lines was in preparation at this analyst's suggestion under the late French President Pompidou. President Pompidou was a scholar who had read Lenin's and Mao's works and Sun Tzu's treatise on 'The Art of War' which dealt with disinformation and its patterns. When President Pompidou died the project was cancelled. But the point is, if the French could recognise the

178

THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION challenge, why cannot the Americans? No other Western government has the capability to make such a reassessment This analyst wishes to conclude with the request that, if something happens to him, this analysis and his suggestions should be treated as his political will and testa-ment. .. One can ignore the analysis and suggestions for a time but one will be forced by future developments to come back to them and start rethinking the unthinkable, though under less favourable conditions. The Communist challenge and threat will be the major preoccupation of US foreign policy for the years ahead'.
- Doppleganger

APPENDIX: 15 JANUARY 1978

175
Memorandum to the CIA: 15 J
ANUARY
1978

THE LONG-RANGE POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND INTENTIONS OF THE SOVIET LEADERS: AN ASSESSMENT OF AN OFFICIAL REPORT BY A SOVIET EMIGRE IN THE LIGHT OF THE COMMUNIST BLOC'S LONG-RANGE STRATEGY AND ITS DISINFORMATION OFFENSIVE
'At the time of the adoption of the long-range strategy in the period 1958 to 1960, there was strong internal opposition to the Soviet regime from dissatisfied workers, collective farmers, intellectuals, clergy, Ukrainian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Jewish nationalists etc. These oppositionists did not call themselves "dissidents" and nor did the KGB call them "dissidents". On the contrary, the KGB and the Party referred to them as "enemies of the regime."... The KGB was instructed to adopt new methods to deal with this opposi-tion, based on the experience of the GPU (the Soviet political police) under Dzerzhin-skiy in the 1920s... This entailed the creation of a false opposition in the USSR and other coun-tries. .. The current "dissident movement" is just such a false opposition designed and created by the KGB.... The main objectives which the Soviet rulers are trying to achieve through the "dissident movement" are as follows: (a)

To confuse, neutralise and dissolve the true internal political opposition in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; (b)

To prevent the West from reaching the genuine internal opposition in the USSR, by introducing to the West a false KGB-controlled opposition. This explains the easy access of the Western media to the alleged "dissidents"; (c)

To influence the foreign policy of the United States through the "dissi-dents' in the interests of the Communist long-range strategy and exploit this issue in the strategy's final phase '. '... Another significant disinformation theme is the alleged existence of "hidden liberals" in the Party establishment. For example, Aleksey Rumyantsev has been described as a liberal. In fact, he is a hardcore Communist who has always worked in the field of ideology. For a number of years after 1958 he was an editor of the interna-tional Communist journal 'Problems of Peace and Socialism'. Because of his position and experience, he was deeply involved in the devel-opment of the new strategy and deceptive tactics. This explains why he is now being misrepresented as a liberal. A similar case is that of an important official who served as a case officer concerned with the pene-tration of a leading Western intelligence service before, during and after the Second World War, who is now being misrepresented as a liberal in the Party establishment. The scale of disinformation on these lines may be expected to increase and new "defectors" may be expected to provide such disinformation '.

176

THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION '... This analyst has reached the following conclusions about probable devel-opments in the USSR: (a)

One can expect the introduction of economic reforms; which will have similarities to Yugoslav or even Western socialist practice.... (b)

Liberalisation of the Soviet regime on the lines of the Czechoslovak liber-alisation of 1968, including an apparent curtailing of the monopoly of the Communist Party, an apparent separation of the legislative, executive and judicial powers, an increased role for the Soviet parliament, 'reform' of the KGB, an amnesty for "dissi-dents", greater artistic and cultural freedom and freedom to travel, compliance with the Helsinki agreements and the emergence of a younger Party leader to initiate the reforms.... (c)

Similar reforms in Eastern Europe including the return of Dubcek in Czechoslovakia and perhaps the demolition of the Berlin Wall... (d)

The liberalisation will, however, be false and will be aimed at breaking up NATO and dismantling the US "military-industrial complex" in the first instance. The new liberal image will be exploited by East Germany politically and diplomati-cally against West Germany to establish their political confederation... (e)

The deceptive liberalisation will be accepted as genuine and spontaneous and will be blown up out of all proportion by the media... (f)

It may generate pressure for real detente and far-reaching changes in Western societies...'. '... The main objectives of the disinformation which is coming from Brezhnev and his Soviet policymakers are: (a)

To reconfirm for US policymakers the essence of the larger Communist disinformation theme that the Communist Bloc does not exist and that Communist ideology is dead; (b)

To conceal the existing secret coordination between the Communist states and Communist Parties in the non-Communist world in the implementation of their long-range strategy in its final phase; (c)

To reconfirm on this basis to US policymakers the correctness of the US detente with the USSR and the correctness of US support for the Soviet "dissidents" as the viable way to bring about the internal liberalisation of the Soviet regime; and, finally: (d)

To prepare US policymakers psychologically for a favourable response to the false liberalisation when it comes. Since this liberalisation in the USSR will be calculated, false and controlled, the conclusion can be drawn that the main purpose of the disinformation is to influ-ence the US response to the coming false liberalisation in the USSR in the interests of their long-range strategy in the final phase. The arrival of other high-level Soviet "defectors" or "official emigres" can be expected, armed with similar disinformation to influence US foreign policy along these lines'.

APPENDIX: 15 JANUARY 1978

177 '... Over the past fifteen years this analyst, in oral and written reports to the CIA and other Western services, has described various aspects of the Communist Bloc's long-range strategy, the new political role of the KGB and the role of disinfor-mation... The West and its scholars underestimate the gravity of the Communist threat which is more serious than after the Second World War when the United States had a nuclear near-monopoly... Communist ideology is alive again and the Communist world is on the political, economic and diplomatic offensive against the West in the framework of their long-range strategy... All means are used in the battle, legal and illegal; that is why they have resorted to the use of disinformation on an unusually large scale, which throws a completely new light on their detente, on their attempt to change the military balance in their favour and, which is most important of all, on their intentions..'. '... A crisis in US foreign policy has been building up since the adoption of the Communist Bloc's long-range strategy because of the West's inability to understand and interpret the true meaning of events in the Communist world. The crisis is hidden, unrecognised... Now the situation is complicated by the activist approach of the Carter Administration to diplomacy towards the USSR, China and Eastern Europe and in seeking solutions to existing conflicts on the basis of misconceptions. An attempt is being made to bring about liberalisation in the USSR without realising the existence of Communist strategy and disinformation and, for example, the falsity of the KGB-controlled "dissident movement"... In this way, a trap is being laid by the Communist policymakers which will be exploited when the USSR carries out a deceptive liberalisation of its regime...'. '... The problems associated with the new Communist tactics, of the political use of their intelligence potential, their agents of influence and their disinformation, have not been dealt with properly for the last eighteen years, and their priority has not been recognised. The US, British and French counter-intelligence services have been impaired by reorganisation and KGB penetration. Counter-intelligence has a key role to play in understanding and dealing with the new dimensions of the Communist threat, since this entails an analysis of US and other sources of information on Communist developments and of how they might have been compromised by penetration or otherwise exploited by the KGB for disinformation purposes... A special committee or group of qualified and reliable people should be set up by the US Government to study this problem. The project should be approved by the President and should be directly under him. The heads of the Senate Intelligence and Foreign Relations Committees, the Senate and House leaders of both parties and the Attorney General should be told and consulted about this project in advance... A confidential project along these lines was in preparation at this analyst's suggestion under the late French President Pompidou. President Pompidou was a scholar who had read Lenin's and Mao's works and Sun Tzu's treatise on 'The Art of War' which dealt with disinformation and its patterns. When President Pompidou died the project was cancelled. But the point is, if the French could recognise the

178

THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION challenge, why cannot the Americans? No other Western government has the capability to make such a reassessment This analyst wishes to conclude with the request that, if something happens to him, this analysis and his suggestions should be treated as his political will and testa-ment. .. One can ignore the analysis and suggestions for a time but one will be forced by future developments to come back to them and start rethinking the unthinkable, though under less favourable conditions. The Communist challenge and threat will be the major preoccupation of US foreign policy for the years ahead'.
- Doppleganger

[quote=Doppleganger]APPENDIX: 15 JANUARY 1978

175
Memorandum to the CIA: 15 J
ANUARY
1978

THE LONG-RANGE POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND INTENTIONS OF THE SOVIET LEADERS: AN ASSESSMENT OF AN OFFICIAL REPORT BY A SOVIET EMIGRE IN THE LIGHT OF THE COMMUNIST BLOC'S LONG-RANGE STRATEGY AND ITS DISINFORMATION OFFENSIVE
'At the time of the adoption of the long-range strategy in the period 1958 to 1960, there was strong internal opposition to the Soviet regime from dissatisfied workers, collective farmers, intellectuals, clergy, Ukrainian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Jewish nationalists etc. These oppositionists did not call themselves "dissidents" and nor did the KGB call them "dissidents". On the contrary, the KGB and the Party referred to them as "enemies of the regime."... The KGB was instructed to adopt new methods to deal with this opposi-tion, based on the experience of the GPU (the Soviet political police) under Dzerzhin-skiy in the 1920s... This entailed the creation of a false opposition in the USSR and other coun-tries. .. The current "dissident movement" is just such a false opposition designed and created by the KGB.... The main objectives which the Soviet rulers are trying to achieve through the "dissident movement" are as follows: (a)

To confuse, neutralise and dissolve the true internal political opposition in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; (b)

To prevent the West from reaching the genuine internal opposition in the USSR, by introducing to the West a false KGB-controlled opposition. This explains the easy access of the Western media to the alleged "dissidents"; (c)

To influence the foreign policy of the United States through the "dissi-dents' in the interests of the Communist long-range strategy and exploit this issue in the strategy's final phase '. '... Another significant disinformation theme is the alleged existence of "hidden liberals" in the Party establishment. For example, Aleksey Rumyantsev has been described as a liberal. In fact, he is a hardcore Communist who has always worked in the field of ideology. For a number of years after 1958 he was an editor of the interna-tional Communist journal 'Problems of Peace and Socialism'. Because of his position and experience, he was deeply involved in the devel-opment of the new strategy and deceptive tactics. This explains why he is now being misrepresented as a liberal. A similar case is that of an important official who served as a case officer concerned with the pene-tration of a leading Western intelligence service before, during and after the Second World War, who is now being misrepresented as a liberal in the Party establishment. The scale of disinformation on these lines may be expected to increase and new "defectors" may be expected to provide such disinformation '.

176

THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION '... This analyst has reached the following conclusions about probable devel-opments in the USSR: (a)

One can expect the introduction of economic reforms; which will have similarities to Yugoslav or even Western socialist practice.... (b)

Liberalisation of the Soviet regime on the lines of the Czechoslovak liber-alisation of 1968, including an apparent curtailing of the monopoly of the Communist Party, an apparent separation of the legislative, executive and judicial powers, an increased role for the Soviet parliament, 'reform' of the KGB, an amnesty for "dissi-dents", greater artistic and cultural freedom and freedom to travel, compliance with the Helsinki agreements and the emergence of a younger Party leader to initiate the reforms.... (c)

Similar reforms in Eastern Europe including the return of Dubcek in Czechoslovakia and perhaps the demolition of the Berlin Wall... (d)

The liberalisation will, however, be false and will be aimed at breaking up NATO and dismantling the US "military-industrial complex" in the first instance. The new liberal image will be exploited by East Germany politically and diplomati-cally against West Germany to establish their political confederation... (e)

The deceptive liberalisation will be accepted as genuine and spontaneous and will be blown up out of all proportion by the media... (f)

It may generate pressure for real detente and far-reaching changes in Western societies...'. '... The main objectives of the disinformation which is coming from Brezhnev and his Soviet policymakers are: (a)

To reconfirm for US policymakers the essence of the larger Communist disinformation theme that the Communist Bloc does not exist and that Communist ideology is dead; (b)

To conceal the existing secret coordination between the Communist states and Communist Parties in the non-Communist world in the implementation of their long-range strategy in its final phase; (c)

To reconfirm on this basis to US policymakers the correctness of the US detente with the USSR and the correctness of US support for the Soviet "dissidents" as the viable way to bring about the internal liberalisation of the Soviet regime; and, finally: (d)

To prepare US policymakers psychologically for a favourable response to the false liberalisation when it comes. Since this liberalisation in the USSR will be calculated, false and controlled, the conclusion can be drawn that the main purpose of the disinformation is to influ-ence the US response to the coming false liberalisation in the USSR in the interests of their long-range strategy in the final phase. The arrival of other high-level Soviet "defectors" or "official emigres" can be expected, armed with similar disinformation to influence US foreign policy along these lines'.

APPENDIX: 15 JANUARY 1978

177 '... Over the past fifteen years this analyst, in oral and written reports to the CIA and other Western services, has described various aspects of the Communist Bloc's long-range strategy, the new political role of the KGB and the role of disinfor-mation... The West and its scholars underestimate the gravity of the Communist threat which is more serious than after the Second World War when the United States had a nuclear near-monopoly... Communist ideology is alive again and the Communist world is on the political, economic and diplomatic offensive against the West in the framework of their long-range strategy... All means are used in the battle, legal and illegal; that is why they have resorted to the use of disinformation on an unusually large scale, which throws a completely new light on their detente, on their attempt to change the military balance in their favour and, which is most important of all, on their intentions..'. '... A crisis in US foreign policy has been building up since the adoption of the Communist Bloc's long-range strategy because of the West's inability to understand and interpret the true meaning of events in the Communist world. The crisis is hidden, unrecognised... Now the situation is complicated by the activist approach of the Carter Administration to diplomacy towards the USSR, China and Eastern Europe and in seeking solutions to existing conflicts on the basis of misconceptions. An attempt is being made to bring about liberalisation in the USSR without realising the existence of Communist strategy and disinformation and, for example, the falsity of the KGB-controlled "dissident movement"... In this way, a trap is being laid by the Communist policymakers which will be exploited when the USSR carries out a deceptive liber

[quote=Doppleganger]APPENDIX: 15 JANUARY 1978

175
Memorandum to the CIA: 15 J
ANUARY
1978

THE LONG-RANGE POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND INTENTIONS OF THE SOVIET LEADERS: AN ASSESSMENT OF AN OFFICIAL REPORT BY A SOVIET EMIGRE IN THE LIGHT OF THE COMMUNIST BLOC'S LONG-RANGE STRATEGY AND ITS DISINFORMATION OFFENSIVE
'At the time of the adoption of the long-range strategy in the period 1958 to 1960, there was strong internal opposition to the Soviet regime from dissatisfied workers, collective farmers, intellectuals, clergy, Ukrainian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Jewish nationalists etc. These oppositionists did not call themselves "dissidents" and nor did the KGB call them "dissidents". On the contrary, the KGB and the Party referred to them as "enemies of the regime."... The KGB was instructed to adopt new methods to deal with this opposi-tion, based on the experience of the GPU (the Soviet political police) under Dzerzhin-skiy in the 1920s... This entailed the creation of a false opposition in the USSR and other coun-tries. .. The current "dissident movement" is just such a false opposition designed and created by the KGB.... The main objectives which the Soviet rulers are trying to achieve through the "dissident movement" are as follows: (a)

To confuse, neutralise and dissolve the true internal political opposition in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; (b)

To prevent the West from reaching the genuine internal opposition in the USSR, by introducing to the West a false KGB-controlled opposition. This explains the easy access of the Western media to the alleged "dissidents"; (c)

To influence the foreign policy of the United States through the "dissi-dents' in the interests of the Communist long-range strategy and exploit this issue in the strategy's final phase '. '... Another significant disinformation theme is the alleged existence of "hidden liberals" in the Party establishment. For example, Aleksey Rumyantsev has been described as a liberal. In fact, he is a hardcore Communist who has always worked in the field of ideology. For a number of years after 1958 he was an editor of the interna-tional Communist journal 'Problems of Peace and Socialism'. Because of his position and experience, he was deeply involved in the devel-opment of the new strategy and deceptive tactics. This explains why he is now being misrepresented as a liberal. A similar case is that of an important official who served as a case officer concerned with the pene-tration of a leading Western intelligence service before, during and after the Second World War, who is now being misrepresented as a liberal in the Party establishment. The scale of disinformation on these lines may be expected to increase and new "defectors" may be expected to provide such disinformation '.

176

THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION '... This analyst has reached the following conclusions about probable devel-opments in the USSR: (a)

One can expect the introduction of economic reforms; which will have similarities to Yugoslav or even Western socialist practice.... (b)

Liberalisation of the Soviet regime on the lines of the Czechoslovak liber-alisation of 1968, including an apparent curtailing of the monopoly of the Communist Party, an apparent separation of the legislative, executive and judicial powers, an increased role for the Soviet parliament, 'reform' of the KGB, an amnesty for "dissi-dents", greater artistic and cultural freedom and freedom to travel, compliance with the Helsinki agreements and the emergence of a younger Party leader to initiate the reforms.... (c)

Similar reforms in Eastern Europe including the return of Dubcek in Czechoslovakia and perhaps the demolition of the Berlin Wall... (d)

The liberalisation will, however, be false and will be aimed at breaking up NATO and dismantling the US "military-industrial complex" in the first instance. The new liberal image will be exploited by East Germany politically and diplomati-cally against West Germany to establish their political confederation... (e)

The deceptive liberalisation will be accepted as genuine and spontaneous and will be blown up out of all proportion by the media... (f)

It may generate pressure for real detente and far-reaching changes in Western societies...'. '... The main objectives of the disinformation which is coming from Brezhnev and his Soviet policymakers are: (a)

To reconfirm for US policymakers the essence of the larger Communist disinformation theme that the Communist Bloc does not exist and that Communist ideology is dead; (b)

To conceal the existing secret coordination between the Communist states and Communist Parties in the non-Communist world in the implementation of their long-range strategy in its final phase; (c)

To reconfirm on this basis to US policymakers the correctness of the US detente with the USSR and the correctness of US support for the Soviet "dissidents" as the viable way to bring about the internal liberalisation of the Soviet regime; and, finally: (d)

To prepare US policymakers psychologically for a favourable response to the false liberalisation when it comes. Since this liberalisation in the USSR will be calculated, false and controlled, the conclusion can be drawn that the main purpose of the disinformation is to influ-ence the US response to the coming false liberalisation in the USSR in the interests of their long-range strategy in the final phase. The arrival of other high-level Soviet "defectors" or "official emigres" can be expected, armed with similar disinformation to influence US foreign policy along these lines'.

APPENDIX: 15 JANUARY 1978

177 '... Over the past fifteen years this analyst, in oral and written reports to the CIA and other Western services, has described various aspects of the Communist Bloc's long-range strategy, the new political role of the KGB and the role of disinfor-mation... The West and its scholars underestimate the gravity of the Communist threat which is more serious than after the Second World War when the United States had a nuclear near-monopoly... Communist ideology is alive again and the Communist world is on the political, economic and diplomatic offensive against the West in the framework of their long-range strategy... All means are used in the battle, legal and illegal; that is why they have resorted to the use of disinformation on an unusually large scale, which throws a completely new light on their detente, on their attempt to change the military balance in their favour and, which is most important of all, on their intentions..'. '... A crisis in US foreign policy has been building up since the adoption of the Communist Bloc's long-range strategy because of the West's inability to understand and interpret the true meaning of events in the Communist world. The crisis is hidden, unrecognised... Now the situation is complicated by the activist approach of the Carter Administration to diplomacy towards the USSR, China and Eastern Europe and in seeking solutions to existing conflicts on the basis of misconceptions. An attempt is being made to bring about liberalisation in the USSR without realising the existence of Communist strategy and disinformation and, for example, the falsity of the KGB-controlled "dissident movement"... In this way, a trap is being laid by the Communist policymakers which will be exploited when the USSR carries out a deceptive liberalisation of its regime...'. '... The problems associated with the new Communist tactics, of the political use of their intelligence potential, their agents of influence and their disinformation, have not been dealt with properly for the last eighteen years, and their priority has not been recognised. The US, British and French counter-intelligence services have been impaired by reorganisation and KGB penetration. Counter-intelligence has a key role to play in understanding and dealing with the new dimensions of the Communist threat, since this entails an analysis of US and other sources of information on Communist developments and of how they might have been compromised by penetration or otherwise exploited by the KGB for disinformation purposes... A special committee or group of qualified and reliable people should be set up by the US Government to study this problem. The project should be approved by the President and should be directly under him. The heads of the Senate Intelligence and Foreign Relations Committees, the Senate and House leaders of both parties and the Attorney General should be told and consulted about this project in advance... A confidential project along these lines was in preparation at this analyst's suggestion under the late French President Pompidou. President Pompidou was a scholar who had read Lenin's and Mao's works and Sun Tzu's treatise on 'The Art of War' which dealt with disinformation and its patterns. When President Pompidou died the project was cancelled. But the point is, if the French could recognise the

178

THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION challenge, why cannot the Americans? No other Western government has the capability to make such a reassessment This analyst wishes to conclude with the request that, if something happens to him, this analysis and his suggestions should be treated as his political will and testa-ment. .. One can ignore the analysis and suggestions for a time but one will be forced by future developments to come back to them and start rethinking the unthinkable, though under less favourable conditions. The Communist challenge and threat will be the major preoccupation of US foreign policy for the years ahead'.
APPENDIX: 15 JANUARY 1978

175
Memorandum to the CIA: 15 J
ANUARY
1978

THE LONG-RANGE POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND INTENTIONS OF THE SOVIET LEADERS: AN ASSESSMENT OF AN OFFICIAL REPORT BY A SOVIET EMIGRE IN THE LIGHT OF THE COMMUNIST BLOC'S LONG-RANGE STRATEGY AND ITS DISINFORMATION OFFENSIVE
'At the time of the adoption of the long-range strategy in the period 1958 to 1960, there was strong internal opposition to the Soviet regime from dissatisfied workers, collective farmers, intellectuals, clergy, Ukrainian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Jewish nationalists etc. These oppositionists did not call themselves "dissidents" and nor did the KGB call them "dissidents". On the contrary, the KGB and the Party referred to them as "enemies of the regime."... The KGB was instructed to adopt new methods to deal with this opposi-tion, based on the experience of the GPU (the Soviet political police) under Dzerzhin-skiy in the 1920s... This entailed the creation of a false opposition in the USSR and other coun-tries. .. The current "dissident movement" is just such a false opposition designed and created by the KGB.... The main objectives which the Soviet rulers are trying to achieve through the "dissident movement" are as follows: (a)

To confuse, neutralise and dissolve the true internal political opposition in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; (b)

To prevent the West from reaching the genuine internal opposition in the USSR, by introducing to the West a false KGB-controlled opposition. This explains the easy access of the Western media to the alleged "dissidents"; (c)

To influence the foreign policy of the United States through the "dissi-dents' in the interests of the Communist long-range strategy and exploit this issue in the strategy's final phase '. '... Another significant disinformation theme is the alleged existence of "hidden liberals" in the Party establishment. For example, Aleksey Rumyantsev has been described as a liberal. In fact, he is a hardcore Communist who has always worked in the field of ideology. For a number of years after 1958 he was an editor of the interna-tional Communist journal 'Problems of Peace and Socialism'. Because of his position and experience, he was deeply involved in the devel-opment of the new strategy and deceptive tactics. This explains why he is now being misrepresented as a liberal. A similar case is that of an important official who served as a case officer concerned with the pene-tration of a leading Western intelligence service before, during and after the Second World War, who is now being misrepresented as a liberal in the Party establishment. The scale of disinformation on these lines may be expected to increase and new "defectors" may be expected to provide such disinformation '.

176

THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION '... This analyst has reached the following conclusions about probable devel-opments in the USSR: (a)

One can expect the introduction of economic reforms; which will have similarities to Yugoslav or even Western socialist practice.... (b)

Liberalisation of the Soviet regime on the lines of the Czechoslovak liber-alisation of 1968, including an apparent curtailing of the monopoly of the Communist Party, an apparent separation of the legislative, executive and judicial powers, an increased role for the Soviet parliament, 'reform' of the KGB, an amnesty for "dissi-dents", greater artistic and cultural freedom and freedom to travel, compliance with the Helsinki agreements and the emergence of a younger Party leader to initiate the reforms.... (c)

Similar reforms in Eastern Europe including the return of Dubcek in Czechoslovakia and perhaps the demolition of the Berlin Wall... (d)

The liberalisation will, however, be false and will be aimed at breaking up NATO and dismantling the US "military-industrial complex" in the first instance. The new liberal image will be exploited by East Germany politically and diplomati-cally against West Germany to establish their political confederation... (e)

The deceptive liberalisation will be accepted as genuine and spontaneous and will be blown up out of all proportion by the media... (f)

It may generate pressure for real detente and far-reaching changes in Western societies...'. '... The main objectives of the disinformation which is coming from Brezhnev and his Soviet policymakers are: (a)

To reconfirm for US policymakers the essence of the larger Communist disinformation theme that the Communist Bloc does not exist and that Communist ideology is dead; (b)

To conceal the existing secret coordination between the Communist states and Communist Parties in the non-Communist world in the implementation of their long-range strategy in its final phase; (c)

To reconfirm on this basis to US policymakers the correctness of the US detente with the USSR and the correctness of US support for the Soviet "dissidents" as the viable way to bring about the internal liberalisation of the Soviet regime; and, finally: (d)

To prepare US policymakers psychologically for a favourable response to the false liberalisation when it comes. Since this liberalisation in the USSR will be calculated, false and controlled, the conclusion can be drawn that the main purpose of the disinformation is to influ-ence the US response to the coming false liberalisation in the USSR in the interests of their long-range strategy in the final phase. The arrival of other high-level Soviet "defectors" or "official emigres" can be expected, armed with similar disinformation to influence US foreign policy along these lines'.

APPENDIX: 15 JANUARY 1978

177 '... Over the past fifteen years this analyst, in oral and written reports to the CIA and other Western services, has described various aspects of the Communist Bloc's long-range strategy, the new political role of the KGB and the role of disinfor-mation... The West and its scholars underestimate the gravity of the Communist threat which is more serious than after the Second World War when the United States had a nuclear near-monopoly... Communist ideology is alive again and the Communist world is on the political, economic and diplomatic offensive against the West in the framework of their long-range strategy... All means are used in the battle, legal and illegal; that is why they have resorted to the use of disinformation on an unusually large scale, which throws a completely new light on their detente, on their attempt to change the military balance in their favour and, which is most important of all, on their intentions..'. '... A crisis in US foreign policy has been building up since the adoption of the Communist Bloc's long-range strategy because of the West's inability to understand and interpret the true meaning of events in the Communist world. The crisis is hidden, unrecognised... Now the situation is complicated by the activist approach of the Carter Administration to diplomacy towards the USSR, China and Eastern Europe and in seeking solutions to existing conflicts on the basis of misconceptions. An attempt is being made to bring about liberalisation in the USSR without realising the existence of Communist strategy and disinformation and, for example, the falsity of the KGB-controlled "dissident movement"... In this way, a trap is being laid by the Communist policymakers which will be exploited when the USSR carries out a deceptive liberalisation of its regime...'. '... The problems associated with the new Communist tactics, of the political use of their intelligence potential, their agents of influence and their disinformation, have not been dealt with properly for the last eighteen years, and their priority has not been recognised. The US, British and French counter-intelligence services have been impaired by reorganisation and KGB penetration. Counter-intelligence has a key role to play in understanding and dealing with the new dimensions of the Communist threat, since this entails an analysis of US and other sources of information on Communist developments and of how they might have been compromised by penetration or otherwise exploited by the KGB for disinformation purposes... A special committee or group of qualified and reliable people should be set up by the US Government to study this problem. The project should be approved by the President and should be directly under him. The heads of the Senate Intelligence and Foreign Relations Committees, the Senate and House leaders of both parties and the Attorney General should be told and consulted about this project in advance... A confidential project along these lines was in preparation at this analyst's suggestion under the late French President Pompidou. President Pompidou was a scholar who had read Lenin's and Mao's works and Sun Tzu's treatise on 'The Art of War' which dealt with disinformation and its patterns. When President Pompidou died the project was cancelled. But the point is, if the French could recognise the

178

THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION challenge, why cannot the Americans? No other Western government has the capability to make such a reassessment This analyst wishes to conclude with the request that, if something happens to him, this analysis and his suggestions should be treated as his political will and testa-ment. .. One can ignore the analysis and suggestions for a time but one will be forced by future developments to come back to them and start rethinking the unthinkable, though under less favourable conditions. The Communist challenge and threat will be the major preoccupation of US foreign policy for the years ahead'.
APPENDIX: 15 JANUARY 1978

175
Memorandum to the CIA: 15 J
ANUARY
1978

THE LONG-RANGE POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND INTENTIONS OF THE SOVIET LEADERS: AN ASSESSMENT OF AN OFFICIAL REPORT BY A SOVIET EMIGRE IN THE LIGHT OF THE COMMUNIST BLOC'S LONG-RANGE STRATEGY AND ITS DISINFORMATION OFFENSIVE
'At the time of the adoption of the long-range strategy in the period 1958 to 1960, there was strong internal opposition to the Soviet regime from dissatisfied workers, collective farmers, intellectuals, clergy, Ukrainian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Jewish nationalists etc. These oppositionists did not call themselves "dissidents" and nor did the KGB call them "dissidents". On the contrary, the KGB and the Party referred to them as "enemies of the regime."... The KGB was instructed to adopt new methods to deal with this opposi-tion, based on the experience of the GPU (the Soviet political police) under Dzerzhin-skiy in the 1920s... This entailed the creation of a false opposition in the USSR and other coun-tries. .. The current "dissident movement" is just such a false opposition designed and created by the KGB.... The main objectives which the Soviet rulers are trying to achieve through the "dissident movement" are as follows: (a)

To confuse, neutralise and dissolve the true internal political opposition in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; (b)

To prevent the West from reaching the genuine internal opposition in the USSR, by introducing to the West a false KGB-controlled opposition. This explains the easy access of the Western media to the alleged "dissidents"; (c)

To influence the foreign policy of the United States through the "dissi-dents' in the interests of the Communist long-range strategy and exploit this issue in the strategy's final phase '. '... Another significant disinformation theme is the alleged existence of "hidden liberals" in the Party establishment. For example, Aleksey Rumyantsev has been described as a liberal. In fact, he is a hardcore Communist who has always worked in the field of ideology. For a number of years after 1958 he was an editor of the interna-tional Communist journal 'Problems of Peace and Socialism'. Because of his position and experience, he was deeply involved in the devel-opment of the new strategy and deceptive tactics. This explains why he is now being misrepresented as a liberal. A similar case is that of an important official who served as a case officer concerned with the pene-tration of a leading Western intelligence service before, during and after the Second World War, who is now being misrepresented as a liberal in the Party establishment. The scale of disinformation on these lines may be expected to increase and new "defectors" may be expected to provide such disinformation '.

176

THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION '... This analyst has reached the following conclusions about probable devel-opments in the USSR: (a)

One can expect the introduction of economic reforms; which will have similarities to Yugoslav or even Western socialist practice.... (b)

Liberalisation of the Soviet regime on the lines of the Czechoslovak liber-alisation of 1968, including an apparent curtailing of the monopoly of the Communist Party, an apparent separation of the legislative, executive and judicial powers, an increased role for the Soviet parliament, 'reform' of the KGB, an amnesty for "dissi-dents", greater artistic and cultural freedom and freedom to travel, compliance with the Helsinki agreements and the emergence of a younger Party leader to initiate the reforms.... (c)

Similar reforms in Eastern Europe including the return of Dubcek in Czechoslovakia and perhaps the demolition of the Berlin Wall... (d)

The liberalisation will, however, be false and will be aimed at breaking up NATO and dismantling the US "military-industrial complex" in the first instance. The new liberal image will be exploited by East Germany politically and diplomati-cally against West Germany to establish their political confederation... (e)

The deceptive liberalisation will be accepted as genuine and spontaneous and will be blown up out of all proportion by the media... (f)

It may generate pressure for real detente and far-reaching changes in Western societies...'. '... The main objectives of the disinformation which is coming from Brezhnev and his Soviet policymakers are: (a)

To reconfirm for US policymakers the essence of the larger Communist disinformation theme that the Communist Bloc does not exist and that Communist ideology is dead; (b)

To conceal the existing secret coordination between the Communist states and Communist Parties in the non-Communist world in the implementation of their long-range strategy in its final phase; (c)

To reconfirm on this basis to US policymakers the correctness of the US detente with the USSR and the correctness of US support for the Soviet "dissidents" as the viable way to bring about the internal liberalisation of the Soviet regime; and, finally: (d)

To prepare US policymakers psychologically for a favourable response to the false liberalisation when it comes. Since this liberalisation in the USSR will be calculated, false and controlled, the conclusion can be drawn that the main purpose of the disinformation is to influ-ence the US response to the coming false liberalisation in the USSR in the interests of their long-range strategy in the final phase. The arrival of other high-level Soviet "defectors" or "official emigres" can be expected, armed with similar disinformation to influence US foreign policy along these lines'.

APPENDIX: 15 JANUARY 1978

177 '... Over the past fifteen years this analyst, in oral and written reports to the CIA and other Western services, has described various aspects of the Communist Bloc's long-range strategy, the new political role of the KGB and the role of disinfor-mation... The West and its scholars underestimate the gravity of the Communist threat which is more serious than after the Second World War when the United States had a nuclear near-monopoly... Communist ideology is alive again and the Communist world is on the political, economic and diplomatic offensive against the West in the framework of their long-range strategy... All means are used in the battle, legal and illegal; that is why they have resorted to the use of disinformation on an unusually large scale, which throws a completely new light on their detente, on their attempt to change the military balance in their favour and, which is most important of all, on their intentions..'. '... A crisis in US foreign policy has been building up since the adoption of the Communist Bloc's long-range strategy because of the West's inability to understand and interpret the true meaning of events in the Communist world. The crisis is hidden, unrecognised... Now the situation is complicated by the activist approach of the Carter Administration to diplomacy towards the USSR, China and Eastern Europe and in seeking solutions to existing conflicts on the basis of misconceptions. An attempt is being made to bring about liberalisation in the USSR without realising the existence of Communist strategy and disinformation and, for example, the falsity of the KGB-controlled "dissident movement"... In this way, a trap is being laid by the Communist policymakers which will be exploited when the USSR carries out a deceptive liberalisation of its regime...'. '... The problems associated with the new Communist tactics, of the political use of their intelligence potential, their agents of influence and their disinformation, have not been dealt with properly for the last eighteen years, and their priority has not been recognised. The US, British and French counter-intelligence services have been impaired by reorganisation and KGB penetration. Counter-intelligence has a key role to play in understanding and dealing with the new dimensions of the Communist threat, since this entails an analysis of US and other sources of information on Communist developments and of how they might have been compromised by penetration or otherwise exploited by the KGB for disinformation purposes... A special committee or group of qualified and reliable people should be set up by the US Government to study this problem. The project should be approved by the President and should be directly under him. The heads of the Senate Intelligence and Foreign Relations Committees, the Senate and House leaders of both parties and the Attorney General should be told and consulted about this project in advance... A confidential project along these lines was in preparation at this analyst's suggestion under the late French President Pompidou. President Pompidou was a scholar who had read Lenin's and Mao's works and Sun Tzu's treatise on 'The Art of War' which dealt with disinformation and its patterns. When President Pompidou died the project was cancelled. But the point is, if the French could recognise the

178

THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION challenge, why cannot the Americans? No other Western government has the capability to make such a reassessment This analyst wishes to conclude with the request that, if something happens to him, this analysis and his suggestions should be treated as his political will and testa-ment. .. One can ignore the analysis and suggestions for a time but one will be forced by future developments to come back to them and start rethinking the unthinkable, though under less favourable conditions. The Communist challenge and threat will be the major preoccupation of US foreign policy for the years ahead'.
APPENDIX: 15 JANUARY 1978

175
Memorandum to the CIA: 15 J
ANUARY
1978

THE LONG-RANGE POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND INTENTIONS OF THE SOVIET LEADERS: AN ASSESSMENT OF AN OFFICIAL REPORT BY A SOVIET EMIGRE IN THE LIGHT OF THE COMMUNIST BLOC'S LONG-RANGE STRATEGY AND ITS DISINFORMATION OFFENSIVE
'At the time of the adoption of the long-range strategy in the period 1958 to 1960, there was strong internal opposition to the Soviet regime from dissatisfied workers, collective farmers, intellectuals, clergy, Ukrainian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Jewish nationalists etc. These oppositionists did not call themselves "dissidents" and nor did the KGB call them "dissidents". On the contrary, the KGB and the Party referred to them as "enemies of the regime."... The KGB was instructed to adopt new methods to deal with this opposi-tion, based on the experience of the GPU (the Soviet political police) under Dzerzhin-skiy in the 1920s... This entailed the creation of a false opposition in the USSR and other coun-tries. .. The current "dissident movement" is just such a false opposition designed and created by the KGB.... The main objectives which the Soviet rulers are trying to achieve through the "dissident movement" are as follows: (a)

To confuse, neutralise and dissolve the true internal political opposition in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; (b)

To prevent the West from reaching the genuine internal opposition in the USSR, by introducing to the West a false KGB-controlled opposition. This explains the easy access of the Western media to the alleged "dissidents"; (c)

To influence the foreign policy of the United States through the "dissi-dents' in the interests of the Communist long-range strategy and exploit this issue in the strategy's final phase '. '... Another significant disinformation theme is the alleged existence of "hidden liberals" in the Party establishment. For example, Aleksey Rumyantsev has been described as a liberal. In fact, he is a hardcore Communist who has always worked in the field of ideology. For a number of years after 1958 he was an editor of the interna-tional Communist journal 'Problems of Peace and Socialism'. Because of his position and experience, he was deeply involved in the devel-opment of the new strategy and deceptive tactics. This explains why he is now being misrepresented as a liberal. A similar case is that of an important official who served as a case officer concerned with the pene-tration of a leading Western intelligence service before, during and after the Second World War, who is now being misrepresented as a liberal in the Party establishment. The scale of disinformation on these lines may be expected to increase and new "defectors" may be expected to provide such disinformation '.

176

THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION '... This analyst has reached the following conclusions about probable devel-opments in the USSR: (a)

One can expect the introduction of economic reforms; which will have similarities to Yugoslav or even Western socialist practice.... (b)

Liberalisation of the Soviet regime on the lines of the Czechoslovak liber-alisation of 1968, including an apparent curtailing of the monopoly of the Communist Party, an apparent separation of the legislative, executive and judicial powers, an increased role for the Soviet parliament, 'reform' of the KGB, an amnesty for "dissi-dents", greater artistic and cultural freedom and freedom to travel, compliance with the Helsinki agreements and the emergence of a younger Party leader to initiate the reforms.... (c)

Similar reforms in Eastern Europe including the return of Dubcek in Czechoslovakia and perhaps the demolition of the Berlin Wall... (d)

The liberalisation will, however, be false and will be aimed at breaking up NATO and dismantling the US "military-industrial complex" in the first instance. The new liberal image will be exploited by East Germany politically and diplomati-cally against West Germany to establish their political confederation... (e)

The deceptive liberalisation will be accepted as genuine and spontaneous and will be blown up out of all proportion by the media... (f)

It may generate pressure for real detente and far-reaching changes in Western societies...'. '... The main objectives of the disinformation which is coming from Brezhnev and his Soviet policymakers are: (a)

To reconfirm for US policymakers the essence of the larger Communist disinformation theme that the Communist Bloc does not exist and that Communist ideology is dead; (b)

To conceal the existing secret coordination between the Communist states and Communist Parties in the non-Communist world in the implementation of their long-range strategy in its final phase; (c)

To reconfirm on this basis to US policymakers the correctness of the US detente with the USSR and the correctness of US support for the Soviet "dissidents" as the viable way to bring about the internal liberalisation of the Soviet regime; and, finally: (d)

To prepare US policymakers psychologically for a favourable response to the false liberalisation when it comes. Since this liberalisation in the USSR will be calculated, false and controlled, the conclusion can be drawn that the main purpose of the disinformation is to influ-ence the US response to the coming false liberalisation in the USSR in the interests of their long-range strategy in the final phase. The arrival of other high-level Soviet "defectors" or "official emigres" can be expected, armed with similar disinformation to influence US foreign policy along these lines'.

APPENDIX: 15 JANUARY 1978

177 '... Over the past fifteen years this analyst, in oral and written reports to the CIA and other Western services, has described various aspects of the Communist Bloc's long-range strategy, the new political role of the KGB and the role of disinfor-mation... The West and its scholars underestimate the gravity of the Communist threat which is more serious than after the Second World War when the United States had a nuclear near-monopoly... Communist ideology is alive again and the Communist world is on the political, economic and diplomatic offensive against the West in the framework of their long-range strategy... All means are used in the battle, legal and illegal; that is why they have resorted to the use of disinformation on an unusually large scale, which throws a completely new light on their detente, on their attempt to change the military balance in their favour and, which is most important of all, on their intentions..'. '... A crisis in US foreign policy has been building up since the adoption of the Communist Bloc's long-range strategy because of the West's inability to understand and interpret the true meaning of events in the Communist world. The crisis is hidden, unrecognised... Now the situation is complicated by the activist approach of the Carter Administration to diplomacy towards the USSR, China and Eastern Europe and in seeking solutions to existing conflicts on the basis of misconceptions. An attempt is being made to bring about liberalisation in the USSR without realising the existence of Communist strategy and disinformation and, for example, the falsity of the KGB-controlled "dissident movement"... In this way, a trap is being laid by the Communist policymakers which will be exploited when the USSR carries out a deceptive liberalisation of its regime...'. '... The problems associated with the new Communist tactics, of the political use of their intelligence potential, their agents of influence and their disinformation, have not been dealt with properly for the last eighteen years, and their priority has not been recognised. The US, British and French counter-intelligence services have been impaired by reorganisation and KGB penetration. Counter-intelligence has a key role to play in understanding and dealing with the new dimensions of the Communist threat, since this entails an analysis of US and other sources of information on Communist developments and of how they might have been compromised by penetration or otherwise exploited by the KGB for disinformation purposes... A special committee or group of qualified and reliable people should be set up by the US Government to study this problem. The project should be approved by the President and should be directly under him. The heads of the Senate Intelligence and Foreign Relations Committees, the Senate and House leaders of both parties and the Attorney General should be told and consulted about this project in advance... A confidential project along these lines was in preparation at this analyst's suggestion under the late French President Pompidou. President Pompidou was a scholar who had read Lenin's and Mao's works and Sun Tzu's treatise on 'The Art of War' which dealt with disinformation and its patterns. When President Pompidou died the project was cancelled. But the point is, if the French could recognise the

178

THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION challenge, why cannot the Americans? No other Western government has the capability to make such a reassessment This analyst wishes to conclude with the request that, if something happens to him, this analysis and his suggestions should be treated as his political will and testa-ment. .. One can ignore the analysis and suggestions for a time but one will be forced by future developments to come back to them and start rethinking the unthinkable, though under less favourable conditions. The Communist challenge and threat will be the major preoccupation of US foreign policy for the years ahead'.
APPENDIX: 15 JANUARY 1978

175
Memorandum to the CIA: 15 J
ANUARY
1978

THE LONG-RANGE POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND INTENTIONS OF THE SOVIET LEADERS: AN ASSESSMENT OF AN OFFICIAL REPORT BY A SOVIET EMIGRE IN THE LIGHT OF THE COMMUNIST BLOC'S LONG-RANGE STRATEGY AND ITS DISINFORMATION OFFENSIVE
'At the time of the adoption of the long-range strategy in the period 1958 to 1960, there was strong internal opposition to the Soviet regime from dissatisfied workers, collective farmers, intellectuals, clergy, Ukrainian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Jewish nationalists etc. These oppositionists did not call themselves "dissidents" and nor did the KGB call them "dissidents". On the contrary, the KGB and the Party referred to them as "enemies of the regime."... The KGB was instructed to adopt new methods to deal with this opposi-tion, based on the experience of the GPU (the Soviet political police) under Dzerzhin-skiy in the 1920s... This entailed the creation of a false opposition in the USSR and other coun-tries. .. The current "dissident movement" is just such a false opposition designed and created by the KGB.... The main objectives which the Soviet rulers are trying to achieve through the "dissident movement" are as follows: (a)

To confuse, neutralise and dissolve the true internal political opposition in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; (b)

To prevent the West from reaching the genuine internal opposition in the USSR, by introducing to the West a false KGB-controlled opposition. This explains the easy access of the Western media to the alleged "dissidents"; (c)

To influence the foreign policy of the United States through the "dissi-dents' in the interests of the Communist long-range strategy and exploit this issue in the strategy's final phase '. '... Another significant disinformation theme is the alleged existence of "hidden liberals" in the Party establishment. For example, Aleksey Rumyantsev has been described as a liberal. In fact, he is a hardcore Communist who has always worked in the field of ideology. For a number of years after 1958 he was an editor of the interna-tional Communist journal 'Problems of Peace and Socialism'. Because of his position and experience, he was deeply involved in the devel-opment of the new strategy and deceptive tactics. This explains why he is now being misrepresented as a liberal. A similar case is that of an important official who served as a case officer concerned with the pene-tration of a leading Western intelligence service before, during and after the Second World War, who is now being misrepresented as a liberal in the Party establishment. The scale of disinformation on these lines may be expected to increase and new "defectors" may be expected to provide such disinformation '.

176

THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION '... This analyst has reached the following conclusions about probable devel-opments in the USSR: (a)

One can expect the introduction of economic reforms; which will have similarities to Yugoslav or even Western socialist practice.... (b)

Liberalisation of the Soviet regime on the lines of the Czechoslovak liber-alisation of 1968, including an apparent curtailing of the monopoly of the Communist Party, an apparent separation of the legislative, executive and judicial powers, an increased role for the Soviet parliament, 'reform' of the KGB, an amnesty for "dissi-dents", greater artistic and cultural freedom and freedom to travel, compliance with the Helsinki agreements and the emergence of a younger Party leader to initiate the reforms.... (c)

Similar reforms in Eastern Europe including the return of Dubcek in Czechoslovakia and perhaps the demolition of the Berlin Wall... (d)

The liberalisation will, however, be false and will be aimed at breaking up NATO and dismantling the US "military-industrial complex" in the first instance. The new liberal image will be exploited by East Germany politically and diplomati-cally against West Germany to establish their political confederation... (e)

The deceptive liberalisation will be accepted as genuine and spontaneous and will be blown up out of all proportion by the media... (f)

It may generate pressure for real detente and far-reaching changes in Western societies...'. '... The main objectives of the disinformation which is coming from Brezhnev and his Soviet policymakers are: (a)

To reconfirm for US policymakers the essence of the larger Communist disinformation theme that the Communist Bloc does not exist and that Communist ideology is dead; (b)

To conceal the existing secret coordination between the Communist states and Communist Parties in the non-Communist world in the implementation of their long-range strategy in its final phase; (c)

To reconfirm on this basis to US policymakers the correctness of the US detente with the USSR and the correctness of US support for the Soviet "dissidents" as the viable way to bring about the internal liberalisation of the Soviet regime; and, finally: (d)

To prepare US policymakers psychologically for a favourable response to the false liberalisation when it comes. Since this liberalisation in the USSR will be calculated, false and controlled, the conclusion can be drawn that the main purpose of the disinformation is to influ-ence the US response to the coming false liberalisation in the USSR in the interests of their long-range strategy in the final phase. The arrival of other high-level Soviet "defectors" or "official emigres" can be expected, armed with similar disinformation to influence US foreign policy along these lines'.

APPENDIX: 15 JANUARY 1978

177 '... Over the past fifteen years this analyst, in oral and written reports to the CIA and other Western services, has described various aspects of the Communist Bloc's long-range strategy, the new political role of the KGB and the role of disinfor-mation... The West and its scholars underestimate the gravity of the Communist threat which is more serious than after the Second World War when the United States had a nuclear near-monopoly... Communist ideology is alive again and the Communist world is on the political, economic and diplomatic offensive against the West in the framework of their long-range strategy... All means are used in the battle, legal and illegal; that is why they have resorted to the use of disinformation on an unusually large scale, which throws a completely new light on their detente, on their attempt to change the military balance in their favour and, which is most important of all, on their intentions..'. '... A crisis in US foreign policy has been building up since the adoption of the Communist Bloc's long-range strategy because of the West's inability to understand and interpret the true meaning of events in the Communist world. The crisis is hidden, unrecognised... Now the situation is complicated by the activist approach of the Carter Administration to diplomacy towards the USSR, China and Eastern Europe and in seeking solutions to existing conflicts on the basis of misconceptions. An attempt is being made to bring about liberalisation in the USSR without realising the existence of Communist strategy and disinformation and, for example, the falsity of the KGB-controlled "dissident movement"... In this way, a trap is being laid by the Communist policymakers which will be exploited when the USSR carries out a deceptive liberalisation of its regime...'. '... The problems associated with the new Communist tactics, of the political use of their intelligence potential, their agents of influence and their disinformation, have not been dealt with properly for the last eighteen years, and their priority has not been recognised. The US, British and French counter-intelligence services have been impaired by reorganisation and KGB penetration. Counter-intelligence has a key role to play in understanding and dealing with the new dimensions of the Communist threat, since this entails an analysis of US and other sources of information on Communist developments and of how they might have been compromised by penetration or otherwise exploited by the KGB for disinformation purposes... A special committee or group of qualified and reliable people should be set up by the US Government to study this problem. The project should be approved by the President and should be directly under him. The heads of the Senate Intelligence and Foreign Relations Committees, the Senate and House leaders of both parties and the Attorney General should be told and consulted about this project in advance... A confidential project along these lines was in preparation at this analyst's suggestion under the late French President Pompidou. President Pompidou was a scholar who had read Lenin's and Mao's works and Sun Tzu's treatise on 'The Art of War' which dealt with disinformation and its patterns. When President Pompidou died the project was cancelled. But the point is, if the French could recognise the

178

THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION challenge, why cannot the Americans? No other Western government has the capability to make such a reassessment This analyst wishes to conclude with the request that, if something happens to him, this analysis and his suggestions should be treated as his political will and testa-ment. .. One can ignore the analysis and suggestions for a time but one will be forced by future developments to come back to them and start rethinking the unthinkable, though under less favourable conditions. The Communist challenge and threat will be the major preoccupation of US foreign policy for the years ahead'.
APPENDIX: 15 JANUARY 1978

175
Memorandum to the CIA: 15 J
ANUARY
1978

THE LONG-RANGE POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND INTENTIONS OF THE SOVIET LEADERS: AN ASSESSMENT OF AN OFFICIAL REPORT BY A SOVIET EMIGRE IN THE LIGHT OF THE COMMUNIST BLOC'S LONG-RANGE STRATEGY AND ITS DISINFORMATION OFFENSIVE
'At the time of the adoption of the long-range strategy in the period 1958 to 1960, there was strong internal opposition to the Soviet regime from dissatisfied workers, collective farmers, intellectuals, clergy, Ukrainian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Jewish nationalists etc. These oppositionists did not call themselves "dissidents" and nor did the KGB call them "dissidents". On the contrary, the KGB and the Party referred to them as "enemies of the regime."... The KGB was instructed to adopt new methods to deal with this opposi-tion, based on the experience of the GPU (the Soviet political police) under Dzerzhin-skiy in the 1920s... This entailed the creation of a false opposition in the USSR and other coun-tries. .. The current "dissident movement" is just such a false opposition designed and created by the KGB.... The main objectives which the Soviet rulers are trying to achieve through the "dissident movement" are as follows: (a)

To confuse, neutralise and dissolve the true internal political opposition in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; (b)

To prevent the West from reaching the genuine internal opposition in the USSR, by introducing to the West a false KGB-controlled opposition. This explains the easy access of the Western media to the alleged "dissidents"; (c)

To influence the foreign policy of the United States through the "dissi-dents' in the interests of the Communist long-range strategy and exploit this issue in the strategy's final phase '. '... Another significant disinformation theme is the alleged existence of "hidden liberals" in the Party establishment. For example, Aleksey Rumyantsev has been described as a liberal. In fact, he is a hardcore Communist who has always worked in the field of ideology. For a number of years after 1958 he was an editor of the interna-tional Communist journal 'Problems of Peace and Socialism'. Because of his position and experience, he was deeply involved in the devel-opment of the new strategy and deceptive tactics. This explains why he is now being misrepresented as a liberal. A similar case is that of an important official who served as a case officer concerned with the pene-tration of a leading Western intelligence service before, during and after the Second World War, who is now being misrepresented as a liberal in the Party establishment. The scale of disinformation on these lines may be expected to increase and new "defectors" may be expected to provide such disinformation '.

176

THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION '... This analyst has reached the following conclusions about probable devel-opments in the USSR: (a)

One can expect the introduction of economic reforms; which will have similarities to Yugoslav or even Western socialist practice.... (b)

Liberalisation of the Soviet regime on the lines of the Czechoslovak liber-alisation of 1968, including an apparent curtailing of the monopoly of the Communist Party, an apparent separation of the legislative, executive and judicial powers, an increased role for the Soviet parliament, 'reform' of the KGB, an amnesty for "dissi-dents", greater artistic and cultural freedom and freedom to travel, compliance with the Helsinki agreements and the emergence of a younger Party leader to initiate the reforms.... (c)

Similar reforms in Eastern Europe including the return of Dubcek in Czechoslovakia and perhaps the demolition of the Berlin Wall... (d)

The liberalisation will, however, be false and will be aimed at breaking up NATO and dismantling the US "military-industrial complex" in the first instance. The new liberal image will be exploited by East Germany politically and diplomati-cally against West Germany to establish their political confederation... (e)

The deceptive liberalisation will be accepted as genuine and spontaneous and will be blown up out of all proportion by the media... (f)

It may generate pressure for real detente and far-reaching changes in Western societies...'. '... The main objectives of the disinformation which is coming from Brezhnev and his Soviet policymakers are: (a)

To reconfirm for US policymakers the essence of the larger Communist disinformation theme that the Communist Bloc does not exist and that Communist ideology is dead; (b)

To conceal the existing secret coordination between the Communist states and Communist Parties in the non-Communist world in the implementation of their long-range strategy in its final phase; (c)

To reconfirm on this basis to US policymakers the correctness of the US detente with the USSR and the correctness of US support for the Soviet "dissidents" as the viable way to bring about the internal liberalisation of the Soviet regime; and, finally: (d)

To prepare US policymakers psychologically for a favourable response to the false liberalisation when it comes. Since this liberalisation in the USSR will be calculated, false and controlled, the conclusion can be drawn that the main purpose of the disinformation is to influ-ence the US response to the coming false liberalisation in the USSR in the interests of their long-range strategy in the final phase. The arrival of other high-level Soviet "defectors" or "official emigres" can be expected, armed with similar disinformation to influence US foreign policy along these lines'.

APPENDIX: 15 JANUARY 1978

177 '... Over the past fifteen years this analyst, in oral and written reports to the CIA and other Western services, has described various aspects of the Communist Bloc's long-range strategy, the new political role of the KGB and the role of disinfor-mation... The West and its scholars underestimate the gravity of the Communist threat which is more serious than after the Second World War when the United States had a nuclear near-monopoly... Communist ideology is alive again and the Communist world is on the political, economic and diplomatic offensive against the West in the framework of their long-range strategy... All means are used in the battle, legal and illegal; that is why they have resorted to the use of disinformation on an unusually large scale, which throws a completely new light on their detente, on their attempt to change the military balance in their favour and, which is most important of all, on their intentions..'. '... A crisis in US foreign policy has been building up since the adoption of the Communist Bloc's long-range strategy because of the West's inability to understand and interpret the true meaning of events in the Communist world. The crisis is hidden, unrecognised... Now the situation is complicated by the activist approach of the Carter Administration to diplomacy towards the USSR, China and Eastern Europe and in seeking solutions to existing conflicts on the basis of misconceptions. An attempt is being made to bring about liberalisation in the USSR without realising the existence of Communist strategy and disinformation and, for example, the falsity of the KGB-controlled "dissident movement"... In this way, a trap is being laid by the Communist policymakers which will be exploited when the USSR carries out a deceptive liberalisation of its regime...'. '... The problems associated with the new Communist tactics, of the political use of their intelligence potential, their agents of influence and their disinformation, have not been dealt with properly for the last eighteen years, and their priority has not been recognised. The US, British and French counter-intelligence services have been impaired by reorganisation and KGB penetration. Counter-intelligence has a key role to play in understanding and dealing with the new dimensions of the Communist threat, since this entails an analysis of US and other sources of information on Communist developments and of how they might have been compromised by penetration or otherwise exploited by the KGB for disinformation purposes... A special committee or group of qualified and reliable people should be set up by the US Government to study this problem. The project should be approved by the President and should be directly under him. The heads of the Senate Intelligence and Foreign Relations Committees, the Senate and House leaders of both parties and the Attorney General should be told and consulted about this project in advance... A confidential project along these lines was in preparation at this analyst's suggestion under the late French President Pompidou. President Pompidou was a scholar who had read Lenin's and Mao's works and Sun Tzu's treatise on 'The Art of War' which dealt with disinformation and its patterns. When President Pompidou died the project was cancelled. But the point is, if the French could recognise the

178

THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION challenge, why cannot the Americans? No other Western government has the capability to make such a reassessment This analyst wishes to conclude with the request that, if something happens to him, this analysis and his suggestions should be treated as his political will and testa-ment. .. One can ignore the analysis and suggestions for a time but one will be forced by future developments to come back to them and start rethinking the unthinkable, though under less favourable conditions. The Communist challenge and threat will be the major preoccupation of US foreign policy for the years ahead'.
APPENDIX: 15 JANUARY 1978

175
Memorandum to the CIA: 15 J
ANUARY
1978

THE LONG-RANGE POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND INTENTIONS OF THE SOVIET LEADERS: AN ASSESSMENT OF AN OFFICIAL REPORT BY A SOVIET EMIGRE IN THE LIGHT OF THE COMMUNIST BLOC'S LONG-RANGE STRATEGY AND ITS DISINFORMATION OFFENSIVE
'At the time of the adoption of the long-range strategy in the period 1958 to 1960, there was strong internal opposition to the Soviet regime from dissatisfied workers, collective farmers, intellectuals, clergy, Ukrainian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Jewish nationalists etc. These oppositionists did not call themselves "dissidents" and nor did the KGB call them "dissidents". On the contrary, the KGB and the Party referred to them as "enemies of the regime."... The KGB was instructed to adopt new methods to deal with this opposi-tion, based on the experience of the GPU (the Soviet political police) under Dzerzhin-skiy in the 1920s... This entailed the creation of a false opposition in the USSR and other coun-tries. .. The current "dissident movement" is just such a false opposition designed and created by the KGB.... The main objectives which the Soviet rulers are trying to achieve through the "dissident movement" are as follows: (a)

To confuse, neutralise and dissolve the true internal political opposition in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; (b)

To prevent the West from reaching the genuine internal opposition in the USSR, by introducing to the West a false KGB-controlled opposition. This explains the easy access of the Western media to the alleged "dissidents"; (c)

To influence the foreign policy of the United States through the "dissi-dents' in the interests of the Communist long-range strategy and exploit this issue in the strategy's final phase '. '... Another significant disinformation theme is the alleged existence of "hidden liberals" in the Party establishment. For example, Aleksey Rumyantsev has been described as a liberal. In fact, he is a hardcore Communist who has always worked in the field of ideology. For a number of years after 1958 he was an editor of the interna-tional Communist journal 'Problems of Peace and Socialism'. Because of his position and experience, he was deeply involved in the devel-opment of the new strategy and deceptive tactics. This explains why he is now being misrepresented as a liberal. A similar case is that of an important official who served as a case officer concerned with the pene-tration of a leading Western intelligence service before, during and after the Second World War, who is now being misrepresented as a liberal in the Party establishment. The scale of disinformation on these lines may be expected to increase and new "defectors" may be expected to provide such disinformation '.

176

THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION '... This analyst has reached the following conclusions about probable devel-opments in the USSR: (a)

One can expect the introduction of economic reforms; which will have similarities to Yugoslav or even Western socialist practice.... (b)

Liberalisation of the Soviet regime on the lines of the Czechoslovak liber-alisation of 1968, including an apparent curtailing of the monopoly of the Communist Party, an apparent separation of the legislative, executive and judicial powers, an increased role for the Soviet parliament, 'reform' of the KGB, an amnesty for "dissi-dents", greater artistic and cultural freedom and freedom to travel, compliance with the Helsinki agreements and the emergence of a younger Party leader to initiate the reforms.... (c)

Similar reforms in Eastern Europe including the return of Dubcek in Czechoslovakia and perhaps the demolition of the Berlin Wall... (d)

The liberalisation will, however, be false and will be aimed at breaking up NATO and dismantling the US "military-industrial complex" in the first instance. The new liberal image will be exploited by East Germany politically and diplomati-cally against West Germany to establish their political confederation... (e)

The deceptive liberalisation will be accepted as genuine and spontaneous and will be blown up out of all proportion by the media... (f)

It may generate pressure for real detente and far-reaching changes in Western societies...'. '... The main objectives of the disinformation which is coming from Brezhnev and his Soviet policymakers are: (a)

To reconfirm for US policymakers the essence of the larger Communist disinformation theme that the Communist Bloc does not exist and that Communist ideology is dead; (b)

To conceal the existing secret coordination between the Communist states and Communist Parties in the non-Communist world in the implementation of their long-range strategy in its final phase; (c)

To reconfirm on this basis to US policymakers the correctness of the US detente with the USSR and the correctness of US support for the Soviet "dissidents" as the viable way to bring about the internal liberalisation of the Soviet regime; and, finally: (d)

To prepare US policymakers psychologically for a favourable response to the false liberalisation when it comes. Since this liberalisation in the USSR will be calculated, false and controlled, the conclusion can be drawn that the main purpose of the disinformation is to influ-ence the US response to the coming false liberalisation in the USSR in the interests of their long-range strategy in the final phase. The arrival of other high-level Soviet "defectors" or "official emigres" can be expected, armed with similar disinformation to influence US foreign policy along these lines'.

APPENDIX: 15 JANUARY 1978

177 '... Over the past fifteen years this analyst, in oral and written reports to the CIA and other Western services, has described various aspects of the Communist Bloc's long-range strategy, the new political role of the KGB and the role of disinfor-mation... The West and its scholars underestimate the gravity of the Communist threat which is more serious than after the Second World War when the United States had a nuclear near-monopoly... Communist ideology is alive again and the Communist world is on the political, economic and diplomatic offensive against the West in the framework of their long-range strategy... All means are used in the battle, legal and illegal; that is why they have resorted to the use of disinformation on an unusually large scale, which throws a completely new light on their detente, on their attempt to change the military balance in their favour and, which is most important of all, on their intentions..'. '... A crisis in US foreign policy has been building up since the adoption of the Communist Bloc's long-range strategy because of the West's inability to understand and interpret the true meaning of events in the Communist world. The crisis is hidden, unrecognised... Now the situation is complicated by the activist approach of the Carter Administration to diplomacy towards the USSR, China and Eastern Europe and in seeking solutions to existing conflicts on the basis of misconceptions. An attempt is being made to bring about liberalisation in the USSR without realising the existence of Communist strategy and disinformation and, for example, the falsity of the KGB-controlled "dissident movement"... In this way, a trap is being laid by the Communist policymakers which will be exploited when the USSR carries out a deceptive liberalisation of its regime...'. '... The problems associated with the new Communist tactics, of the political use of their intelligence potential, their agents of influenc

sorry about the page, guys. i really (frank)ed that up.

all i really wanted to do was ask watson: why do you insist on posting right
below him?

for (frank)s sake man, when you copy and paste, atleast make sure the composition gets pasted correctly, the least you can do is make sure January is one (frank)ing word
- watsonnostaw

bump

APPENDIX: 15 JANUARY 1978

175
Memorandum to the CIA: 15 J
ANUARY
1978

THE LONG-RANGE POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND INTENTIONS OF THE SOVIET LEADERS: AN ASSESSMENT OF AN OFFICIAL REPORT BY A SOVIET EMIGRE IN THE LIGHT OF THE COMMUNIST BLOC'S LONG-RANGE STRATEGY AND ITS DISINFORMATION OFFENSIVE
'At the time of the adoption of the long-range strategy in the period 1958 to 1960, there was strong internal opposition to the Soviet regime from dissatisfied workers, collective farmers, intellectuals, clergy, Ukrainian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Jewish nationalists etc. These oppositionists did not call themselves "dissidents" and nor did the KGB call them "dissidents". On the contrary, the KGB and the Party referred to them as "enemies of the regime."... The KGB was instructed to adopt new methods to deal with this opposi-tion, based on the experience of the GPU (the Soviet political police) under Dzerzhin-skiy in the 1920s... This entailed the creation of a false opposition in the USSR and other coun-tries. .. The current "dissident movement" is just such a false opposition designed and created by the KGB.... The main objectives which the Soviet rulers are trying to achieve through the "dissident movement" are as follows: (a)

To confuse, neutralise and dissolve the true internal political opposition in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; (b)

To prevent the West from reaching the genuine internal opposition in the USSR, by introducing to the West a false KGB-controlled opposition. This explains the easy access of the Western media to the alleged "dissidents"; (c)

To influence the foreign policy of the United States through the "dissi-dents' in the interests of the Communist long-range strategy and exploit this issue in the strategy's final phase '. '... Another significant disinformation theme is the alleged existence of "hidden liberals" in the Party establishment. For example, Aleksey Rumyantsev has been described as a liberal. In fact, he is a hardcore Communist who has always worked in the field of ideology. For a number of years after 1958 he was an editor of the interna-tional Communist journal 'Problems of Peace and Socialism'. Because of his position and experience, he was deeply involved in the devel-opment of the new strategy and deceptive tactics. This explains why he is now being misrepresented as a liberal. A similar case is that of an important official who served as a case officer concerned with the pene-tration of a leading Western intelligence service before, during and after the Second World War, who is now being misrepresented as a liberal in the Party establishment. The scale of disinformation on these lines may be expected to increase and new "defectors" may be expected to provide such disinformation '.

176

THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION '... This analyst has reached the following conclusions about probable devel-opments in the USSR: (a)

One can expect the introduction of economic reforms; which will have similarities to Yugoslav or even Western socialist practice.... (b)

Liberalisation of the Soviet regime on the lines of the Czechoslovak liber-alisation of 1968, including an apparent curtailing of the monopoly of the Communist Party, an apparent separation of the legislative, executive and judicial powers, an increased role for the Soviet parliament, 'reform' of the KGB, an amnesty for "dissi-dents", greater artistic and cultural freedom and freedom to travel, compliance with the Helsinki agreements and the emergence of a younger Party leader to initiate the reforms.... (c)

Similar reforms in Eastern Europe including the return of Dubcek in Czechoslovakia and perhaps the demolition of the Berlin Wall... (d)

The liberalisation will, however, be false and will be aimed at breaking up NATO and dismantling the US "military-industrial complex" in the first instance. The new liberal image will be exploited by East Germany politically and diplomati-cally against West Germany to establish their political confederation... (e)

The deceptive liberalisation will be accepted as genuine and spontaneous and will be blown up out of all proportion by the media... (f)

It may generate pressure for real detente and far-reaching changes in Western societies...'. '... The main objectives of the disinformation which is coming from Brezhnev and his Soviet policymakers are: (a)

To reconfirm for US policymakers the essence of the larger Communist disinformation theme that the Communist Bloc does not exist and that Communist ideology is dead; (b)

To conceal the existing secret coordination between the Communist states and Communist Parties in the non-Communist world in the implementation of their long-range strategy in its final phase; (c)

To reconfirm on this basis to US policymakers the correctness of the US detente with the USSR and the correctness of US support for the Soviet "dissidents" as the viable way to bring about the internal liberalisation of the Soviet regime; and, finally: (d)

To prepare US policymakers psychologically for a favourable response to the false liberalisation when it comes. Since this liberalisation in the USSR will be calculated, false and controlled, the conclusion can be drawn that the main purpose of the disinformation is to influ-ence the US response to the coming false liberalisation in the USSR in the interests of their long-range strategy in the final phase. The arrival of other high-level Soviet "defectors" or "official emigres" can be expected, armed with similar disinformation to influence US foreign policy along these lines'.

APPENDIX: 15 JANUARY 1978

177 '... Over the past fifteen years this analyst, in oral and written reports to the CIA and other Western services, has described various aspects of the Communist Bloc's long-range strategy, the new political role of the KGB and the role of disinfor-mation... The West and its scholars underestimate the gravity of the Communist threat which is more serious than after the Second World War when the United States had a nuclear near-monopoly... Communist ideology is alive again and the Communist world is on the political, economic and diplomatic offensive against the West in the framework of their long-range strategy... All means are used in the battle, legal and illegal; that is why they have resorted to the use of disinformation on an unusually large scale, which throws a completely new light on their detente, on their attempt to change the military balance in their favour and, which is most important of all, on their intentions..'. '... A crisis in US foreign policy has been building up since the adoption of the Communist Bloc's long-range strategy because of the West's inability to understand and interpret the true meaning of events in the Communist world. The crisis is hidden, unrecognised... Now the situation is complicated by the activist approach of the Carter Administration to diplomacy towards the USSR, China and Eastern Europe and in seeking solutions to existing conflicts on the basis of misconceptions. An attempt is being made to bring about liberalisation in the USSR without realising the existence of Communist strategy and disinformation and, for example, the falsity of the KGB-controlled "dissident movement"... In this way, a trap is being laid by the Communist policymakers which will be exploited when the USSR carries out a deceptive liberalisation of its regime...'. '... The problems associated with the new Communist tactics, of the political use of their intelligence potential, their agents of influence and their disinformation, have not been dealt with properly for the last eighteen years, and their priority has not been recognised. The US, British and French counter-intelligence services have been impaired by reorganisation and KGB penetration. Counter-intelligence has a key role to play in understanding and dealing with the new dimensions of the Communist threat, since this entails an analysis of US and other sources of information on Communist developments and of how they might have been compromised by penetration or otherwise exploited by the KGB for disinformation purposes... A special committee or group of qualified and reliable people should be set up by the US Government to study this problem. The project should be approved by the President and should be directly under him. The heads of the Senate Intelligence and Foreign Relations Committees, the Senate and House leaders of both parties and the Attorney General should be told and consulted about this project in advance... A confidential project along these lines was in preparation at this analyst's suggestion under the late French President Pompidou. President Pompidou was a scholar who had read Lenin's and Mao's works and Sun Tzu's treatise on 'The Art of War' which dealt with disinformation and its patterns. When President Pompidou died the project was cancelled. But the point is, if the French could recognise the

178

THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION challenge, why cannot the Americans? No other Western government has the capability to make such a reassessment This analyst wishes to conclude with the request that, if something happens to him, this analysis and his suggestions should be treated as his political will and testa-ment. .. One can ignore the analysis and suggestions for a time but one will be forced by future developments to come back to them and start rethinking the unthinkable, though under less favourable conditions. The Communist challenge and threat will be the major preoccupation of US foreign policy for the years ahead'.
- Doppleganger

Post link please.

Post link please.
- AGalchenyuk27

- watsonnostaw

[quote=kicksave856][quote=Doppleganger]APPENDIX: 15 JANUARY 1978

175
Memorandum to the CIA: 15 J
ANUARY
1978

THE LONG-RANGE POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND INTENTIONS OF THE SOVIET LEADERS: AN ASSESSMENT OF AN OFFICIAL REPORT BY A SOVIET EMIGRE IN THE LIGHT OF THE COMMUNIST BLOC'S LONG-RANGE STRATEGY AND ITS DISINFORMATION OFFENSIVE
'At the time of the adoption of the long-range strategy in the period 1958 to 1960, there was strong internal opposition to the Soviet regime from dissatisfied workers, collective farmers, intellectuals, clergy, Ukrainian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Jewish nationalists etc. These oppositionists did not call themselves "dissidents" and nor did the KGB call them "dissidents". On the contrary, the KGB and the Party referred to them as "enemies of the regime."... The KGB was instructed to adopt new methods to deal with this opposi-tion, based on the experience of the GPU (the Soviet political police) under Dzerzhin-skiy in the 1920s... This entailed the creation of a false opposition in the USSR and other coun-tries. .. The current "dissident movement" is just such a false opposition designed and created by the KGB.... The main objectives which the Soviet rulers are trying to achieve through the "dissident movement" are as follows: (a)

To confuse, neutralise and dissolve the true internal political opposition in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; (b)

To prevent the West from reaching the genuine internal opposition in the USSR, by introducing to the West a false KGB-controlled opposition. This explains the easy access of the Western media to the alleged "dissidents"; (c)

To influence the foreign policy of the United States through the "dissi-dents' in the interests of the Communist long-range strategy and exploit this issue in the strategy's final phase '. '... Another significant disinformation theme is the alleged existence of "hidden liberals" in the Party establishment. For example, Aleksey Rumyantsev has been described as a liberal. In fact, he is a hardcore Communist who has always worked in the field of ideology. For a number of years after 1958 he was an editor of the interna-tional Communist journal 'Problems of Peace and Socialism'. Because of his position and experience, he was deeply involved in the devel-opment of the new strategy and deceptive tactics. This explains why he is now being misrepresented as a liberal. A similar case is that of an important official who served as a case officer concerned with the pene-tration of a leading Western intelligence service before, during and after the Second World War, who is now being misrepresented as a liberal in the Party establishment. The scale of disinformation on these lines may be expected to increase and new "defectors" may be expected to provide such disinformation '.

176

THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION '... This analyst has reached the following conclusions about probable devel-opments in the USSR: (a)

One can expect the introduction of economic reforms; which will have similarities to Yugoslav or even Western socialist practice.... (b)

Liberalisation of the Soviet regime on the lines of the Czechoslovak liber-alisation of 1968, including an apparent curtailing of the monopoly of the Communist Party, an apparent separation of the legislative, executive and judicial powers, an increased role for the Soviet parliament, 'reform' of the KGB, an amnesty for "dissi-dents", greater artistic and cultural freedom and freedom to travel, compliance with the Helsinki agreements and the emergence of a younger Party leader to initiate the reforms.... (c)

Similar reforms in Eastern Europe including the return of Dubcek in Czechoslovakia and perhaps the demolition of the Berlin Wall... (d)

The liberalisation will, however, be false and will be aimed at breaking up NATO and dismantling the US "military-industrial complex" in the first instance. The new liberal image will be exploited by East Germany politically and diplomati-cally against West Germany to establish their political confederation... (e)

The deceptive liberalisation will be accepted as genuine and spontaneous and will be blown up out of all proportion by the media... (f)

It may generate pressure for real detente and far-reaching changes in Western societies...'. '... The main objectives of the disinformation which is coming from Brezhnev and his Soviet policymakers are: (a)

To reconfirm for US policymakers the essence of the larger Communist disinformation theme that the Communist Bloc does not exist and that Communist ideology is dead; (b)

To conceal the existing secret coordination between the Communist states and Communist Parties in the non-Communist world in the implementation of their long-range strategy in its final phase; (c)

To reconfirm on this basis to US policymakers the correctness of the US detente with the USSR and the correctness of US support for the Soviet "dissidents" as the viable way to bring about the internal liberalisation of the Soviet regime; and, finally: (d)

To prepare US policymakers psychologically for a favourable response to the false liberalisation when it comes. Since this liberalisation in the USSR will be calculated, false and controlled, the conclusion can be drawn that the main purpose of the disinformation is to influ-ence the US response to the coming false liberalisation in the USSR in the interests of their long-range strategy in the final phase. The arrival of other high-level Soviet "defectors" or "official emigres" can be expected, armed with similar disinformation to influence US foreign policy along these lines'.

APPENDIX: 15 JANUARY 1978

177 '... Over the past fifteen years this analyst, in oral and written reports to the CIA and other Western services, has described various aspects of the Communist Bloc's long-range strategy, the new political role of the KGB and the role of disinfor-mation... The West and its scholars underestimate the gravity of the Communist threat which is more serious than after the Second World War when the United States had a nuclear near-monopoly... Communist ideology is alive again and the Communist world is on the political, economic and diplomatic offensive against the West in the framework of their long-range strategy... All means are used in the battle, legal and illegal; that is why they have resorted to the use of disinformation on an unusually large scale, which throws a completely new light on their detente, on their attempt to change the military balance in their favour and, which is most important of all, on their intentions..'. '... A crisis in US foreign policy has been building up since the adoption of the Communist Bloc's long-range strategy because of the West's inability to understand and interpret the true meaning of events in the Communist world. The crisis is hidden, unrecognised... Now the situation is complicated by the activist approach of the Carter Administration to diplomacy towards the USSR, China and Eastern Europe and in seeking solutions to existing conflicts on the basis of misconceptions. An attempt is being made to bring about liberalisation in the USSR without realising the existence of Communist strategy and disinformation and, for example, the falsity of the KGB-controlled "dissident movement"... In this way, a trap is being laid by the Communist policymakers which will be exploited when the USSR carries out a deceptive liberalisation of its regime...'. '... The problems associated with the new Communist tactics, of the political use of their intelligence potential, their agents of influence and their disinformation, have not been dealt with properly for the last eighteen years, and their priority has not been recognised. The US, British and French counter-intelligence services have been impaired by reorganisation and KGB penetration. Counter-intelligence has a key role to play in understanding and dealing with the new dimensions of the Communist threat, since this entails an analysis of US and other sources of information on Communist developments and of how they might have been compromised by penetration or otherwise exploited by the KGB for disinformation purposes... A special committee or group of qualified and reliable people should be set up by the US Government to study this problem. The project should be approved by the President and should be directly under him. The heads of the Senate Intelligence and Foreign Relations Committees, the Senate and House leaders of both parties and the Attorney General should be told and consulted about this project in advance... A confidential project along these lines was in preparation at this analyst's suggestion under the late French President Pompidou. President Pompidou was a scholar who had read Lenin's and Mao's works and Sun Tzu's treatise on 'The Art of War' which dealt with disinformation and its patterns. When President Pompidou died the project was cancelled. But the point is, if the French could recognise the

178

THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION challenge, why cannot the Americans? No other Western government has the capability to make such a reassessment This analyst wishes to conclude with the request that, if something happens to him, this analysis and his suggestions should be treated as his political will and testa-ment. .. One can ignore the analysis and suggestions for a time but one will be forced by future developments to come back to them and start rethinking the unthinkable, though under less favourable conditions. The Communist challenge and threat will be the major preoccupation of US foreign policy for the years ahead'.
APPENDIX: 15 JANUARY 1978

175
Memorandum to the CIA: 15 J
ANUARY
1978

THE LONG-RANGE POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND INTENTIONS OF THE SOVIET LEADERS: AN ASSESSMENT OF AN OFFICIAL REPORT BY A SOVIET EMIGRE IN THE LIGHT OF THE COMMUNIST BLOC'S LONG-RANGE STRATEGY AND ITS DISINFORMATION OFFENSIVE
'At the time of the adoption of the long-range strategy in the period 1958 to 1960, there was strong internal opposition to the Soviet regime from dissatisfied workers, collective farmers, intellectuals, clergy, Ukrainian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Jewish nationalists etc. These oppositionists did not call themselves "dissidents" and nor did the KGB call them "dissidents". On the contrary, the KGB and the Party referred to them as "enemies of the regime."... The KGB was instructed to adopt new methods to deal with this opposi-tion, based on the experience of the GPU (the Soviet political police) under Dzerzhin-skiy in the 1920s... This entailed the creation of a false opposition in the USSR and other coun-tries. .. The current "dissident movement" is just such a false opposition designed and created by the KGB.... The main objectives which the Soviet rulers are trying to achieve through the "dissident movement" are as follows: (a)

To confuse, neutralise and dissolve the true internal political opposition in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; (b)

To prevent the West from reaching the genuine internal opposition in the USSR, by introducing to the West a false KGB-controlled opposition. This explains the easy access of the Western media to the alleged "dissidents"; (c)

To influence the foreign policy of the United States through the "dissi-dents' in the interests of the Communist long-range strategy and exploit this issue in the strategy's final phase '. '... Another significant disinformation theme is the alleged existence of "hidden liberals" in the Party establishment. For example, Aleksey Rumyantsev has been described as a liberal. In fact, he is a hardcore Communist who has always worked in the field of ideology. For a number of years after 1958 he was an editor of the interna-tional Communist journal 'Problems of Peace and Socialism'. Because of his position and experience, he was deeply involved in the devel-opment of the new strategy and deceptive tactics. This explains why he is now being misrepresented as a liberal. A similar case is that of an important official who served as a case officer concerned with the pene-tration of a leading Western intelligence service before, during and after the Second World War, who is now being misrepresented as a liberal in the Party establishment. The scale of disinformation on these lines may be expected to increase and new "defectors" may be expected to provide such disinformation '.

176

THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION '... This analyst has reached the following conclusions about probable devel-opments in the USSR: (a)

One can expect the introduction of economic reforms; which will have similarities to Yugoslav or even Western socialist practice.... (b)

Liberalisation of the Soviet regime on the lines of the Czechoslovak liber-alisation of 1968, including an apparent curtailing of the monopoly of the Communist Party, an apparent separation of the legislative, executive and judicial powers, an increased role for the Soviet parliament, 'reform' of the KGB, an amnesty for "dissi-dents", greater artistic and cultural freedom and freedom to travel, compliance with the Helsinki agreements and the emergence of a younger Party leader to initiate the reforms.... (c)

Similar reforms in Eastern Europe including the return of Dubcek in Czechoslovakia and perhaps the demolition of the Berlin Wall... (d)

The liberalisation will, however, be false and will be aimed at breaking up NATO and dismantling the US "military-industrial complex" in the first instance. The new liberal image will be exploited by East Germany politically and diplomati-cally against West Germany to establish their political confederation... (e)

The deceptive liberalisation will be accepted as genuine and spontaneous and will be blown up out of all proportion by the media... (f)

It may generate pressure for real detente and far-reaching changes in Western societies...'. '... The main objectives of the disinformation which is coming from Brezhnev and his Soviet policymakers are: (a)

To reconfirm for US policymakers the essence of the larger Communist disinformation theme that the Communist Bloc does not exist and that Communist ideology is dead; (b)

To conceal the existing secret coordination between the Communist states and Communist Parties in the non-Communist world in the implementation of their long-range strategy in its final phase; (c)

To reconfirm on this basis to US policymakers the correctness of the US detente with the USSR and the correctness of US support for the Soviet "dissidents" as the viable way to bring about the internal liberalisation of the Soviet regime; and, finally: (d)

To prepare US policymakers psychologically for a favourable response to the false liberalisation when it comes. Since this liberalisation in the USSR will be calculated, false and controlled, the conclusion can be drawn that the main purpose of the disinformation is to influ-ence the US response to the coming false liberalisation in the USSR in the interests of their long-range strategy in the final phase. The arrival of other high-level Soviet "defectors" or "official emigres" can be expected, armed with similar disinformation to influence US foreign policy along these lines'.

APPENDIX: 15 JANUARY 1978

177 '... Over the past fifteen years this analyst, in oral and written reports to the CIA and other Western services, has described various aspects of the Communist Bloc's long-range strategy, the new political role of the KGB and the role of disinfor-mation... The West and its scholars underestimate the gravity of the Communist threat which is more serious than after the Second World War when the United States had a nuclear near-monopoly... Communist ideology is alive again and the Communist world is on the political, economic and diplomatic offensive against the West in the framework of their long-range strategy... All means are used in the battle, legal and illegal; that is why they have resorted to the use of disinformation on an unusually large scale, which throws a completely new light on their detente, on their attempt to change the military balance in their favour and, which is most important of all, on their intentions..'. '... A crisis in US foreign policy has been building up since the adoption of the Communist Bloc's long-range strategy because of the West's inability to understand and interpret the true meaning of events in the Communist world. The crisis is hidden, unrecognised... Now the situation is complicated by the activist approach of the Carter Administration to diplomacy towards the USSR, China and Eastern Europe and in seeking solutions to existing conflicts on the basis of misconceptions. An attempt is being made to bring about liberalisation in the USSR without realising the existence of Communist strategy and disinformation and, for example, the falsity of the KGB-controlled "dissident movement"... In this way, a trap is being laid by the Communist policymakers which will be exploited when the USSR carries out a deceptive liberalisation of its regime...'. '... The problems associated with the new Communist tactics, of the political use of their intelligence potential, their agents of influence and their disinformation, have not been dealt with properly for the last eighteen years, and their priority has not been recognised. The US, British and French counter-intelligence services have been impaired by reorganisation and KGB penetration. Counter-intelligence has a key role to play in understanding and dealing with the new dimensions of the Communist threat, since this entails an analysis of US and other sources of information on Communist developments and of how they might have been compromised by penetration or otherwise exploited by the KGB for disinformation purposes... A special committee or group of qualified and reliable people should be set up by the US Government to study this problem. The project should be approved by the President and should be directly under him. The heads of the Senate Intelligence and Foreign Relations Committees, the Senate and House leaders of both parties and the Attorney General should be told and consulted about this project in advance... A confidential project along these lines was in preparation at this analyst's suggestion under the late French President Pompidou. President Pompidou was a scholar who had read Lenin's and Mao's works and Sun Tzu's treatise on 'The Art of War' which dealt with disinformation and its patterns. When President Pompidou died the project was cancelled. But the point is, if the French could recognise the

178

THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION challenge, why cannot the Americans? No other Western government has the capability to make such a reassessment This analyst wishes to conclude with the request that, if something happens to him, this analysis and his suggestions should be treated as his political will and testa-ment. .. One can ignore the analysis and suggestions for a time but one will be forced by future developments to come back to them and start rethinking the unthinkable, though under less favourable conditions. The Communist challenge and threat will be the major preoccupation of US foreign policy for the years ahead'.
APPENDIX: 15 JANUARY 1978

175
Memorandum to the CIA: 15 J
ANUARY
1978

THE LONG-RANGE POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND INTENTIONS OF THE SOVIET LEADERS: AN ASSESSMENT OF AN OFFICIAL REPORT BY A SOVIET EMIGRE IN THE LIGHT OF THE COMMUNIST BLOC'S LONG-RANGE STRATEGY AND ITS DISINFORMATION OFFENSIVE
'At the time of the adoption of the long-range strategy in the period 1958 to 1960, there was strong internal opposition to the Soviet regime from dissatisfied workers, collective farmers, intellectuals, clergy, Ukrainian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Jewish nationalists etc. These oppositionists did not call themselves "dissidents" and nor did the KGB call them "dissidents". On the contrary, the KGB and the Party referred to them as "enemies of the regime."... The KGB was instructed to adopt new methods to deal with this opposi-tion, based on the experience of the GPU (the Soviet political police) under Dzerzhin-skiy in the 1920s... This entailed the creation of a false opposition in the USSR and other coun-tries. .. The current "dissident movement" is just such a false opposition designed and created by the KGB.... The main objectives which the Soviet rulers are trying to achieve through the "dissident movement" are as follows: (a)

To confuse, neutralise and dissolve the true internal political opposition in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; (b)

To prevent the West from reaching the genuine internal opposition in the USSR, by introducing to the West a false KGB-controlled opposition. This explains the easy access of the Western media to the alleged "dissidents"; (c)

To influence the foreign policy of the United States through the "dissi-dents' in the interests of the Communist long-range strategy and exploit this issue in the strategy's final phase '. '... Another significant disinformation theme is the alleged existence of "hidden liberals" in the Party establishment. For example, Aleksey Rumyantsev has been described as a liberal. In fact, he is a hardcore Communist who has always worked in the field of ideology. For a number of years after 1958 he was an editor of the interna-tional Communist journal 'Problems of Peace and Socialism'. Because of his position and experience, he was deeply involved in the devel-opment of the new strategy and deceptive tactics. This explains why he is now being misrepresented as a liberal. A similar case is that of an important official who served as a case officer concerned with the pene-tration of a leading Western intelligence service before, during and after the Second World War, who is now being misrepresented as a liberal in the Party establishment. The scale of disinformation on these lines may be expected to increase and new "defectors" may be expected to provide such disinformation '.

176

THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION '... This analyst has reached the following conclusions about probable devel-opments in the USSR: (a)

One can expect the introduction of economic reforms; which will have similarities to Yugoslav or even Western socialist practice.... (b)

Liberalisation of the Soviet regime on the lines of the Czechoslovak liber-alisation of 1968, including an apparent curtailing of the monopoly of the Communist Party, an apparent separation of the legislative, executive and judicial powers, an increased role for the Soviet parliament, 'reform' of the KGB, an amnesty for "dissi-dents", greater artistic and cultural freedom and freedom to travel, compliance with the Helsinki agreements and the emergence of a younger Party leader to initiate the reforms.... (c)

Similar reforms in Eastern Europe including the return of Dubcek in Czechoslovakia and perhaps the demolition of the Berlin Wall... (d)

The liberalisation will, however, be false and will be aimed at breaking up NATO and dismantling the US "military-industrial complex" in the first instance. The new liberal image will be exploited by East Germany politically and diplomati-cally against West Germany to establish their political confederation... (e)

The deceptive liberalisation will be accepted as genuine and spontaneous and will be blown up out of all proportion by the media... (f)

It may generate pressure for real detente and far-reaching changes in Western societies...'. '... The main objectives of the disinformation which is coming from Brezhnev and his Soviet policymakers are: (a)

To reconfirm for US policymakers the essence of the larger Communist disinformation theme that the Communist Bloc does not exist and that Communist ideology is dead; (b)

To conceal the existing secret coordination between the Communist states and Communist Parties in the non-Communist world in the implementation of their long-range strategy in its final phase; (c)

To reconfirm on this basis to US policymakers the correctness of the US detente with the USSR and the correctness of US support for the Soviet "dissidents" as the viable way to bring about the internal liberalisation of the Soviet regime; and, finally: (d)

To prepare US policymakers psychologically for a favourable response to the false liberalisation when it comes. Since this liberalisation in the USSR will be calculated, false and controlled, the conclusion can be drawn that the main purpose of the disinformation is to influ-ence the US response to the coming false liberalisation in the USSR in the interests of their long-range strategy in the final phase. The arrival of other high-level Soviet "defectors" or "official emigres" can be expected, armed with similar disinformation to influence US foreign policy along these lines'.

APPENDIX: 15 JANUARY 1978

177 '... Over the past fifteen years this analyst, in oral and written reports to the CIA and other Western services, has described various aspects of the Communist Bloc's long-range strategy, the new political role of the KGB and the role of disinfor-mation... The West and its scholars underestimate the gravity of the Communist threat which is more serious than after the Second World War when the United States had a nuclear near-monopoly... Communist ideology is alive again and the Communist world is on the political, economic and diplomatic offensive against the West in the framework of their long-range strategy... All means are used in the battle, legal and illegal; that is why they have resorted to the use of disinformation on an unusually large scale, which throws a completely new light on their detente, on their attempt to change the military balance in their favour and, which is most important of all, on their intentions..'. '... A crisis in US foreign policy has been building up since the adoption of the Communist Bloc's long-range strategy because of the West's inability to understand and interpret the true meaning of events in the Communist world. The crisis is hidden, unrecognised... Now the situation is complicated by the activist approach of the Carter Administration to diplomacy towards the USSR, China and Eastern Europe and in seeking solutions to existing conflicts on the basis of misconceptions. An attempt is being made to bring about liberalisation in the USSR without realising the existence of Communist strategy and disinformation and, for example, the falsity of the KGB-controlled "dissident movement"... In this way, a trap is being laid by the Communist policymakers which will be exploited when the USSR carries out a deceptive liberalisation of its regime...'. '... The problems associated with the new Communist tactics, of the political use of their intelligence potential, their agents of influence and their disinformation, have not been dealt with properly for the last eighteen years, and their priority has not been recognised. The US, British and French counter-intelligence services have been impaired by reorganisation and KGB penetration. Counter-intelligence has a key role to play in understanding and dealing with the new dimensions of the Communist threat, since this entails an analysis of US and other sources of information on Communist developments and of how they might have been compromised by penetration or otherwise exploited by the KGB for disinformation purposes... A special committee or group of qualified and reliable people should be set up by the US Government to study this problem. The project should be approved by the President and should be directly under him. The heads of the Senate Intelligence and Foreign Relations Committees, the Senate and House leaders of both parties and the Attorney General should be told and consulted about this project in advance... A confidential project along these lines was in preparation at this analyst's suggestion under the late French President Pompidou. President Pompidou was a scholar who had read Lenin's and Mao's works and Sun Tzu's treatise on 'The Art of War' which dealt with disinformation and its patterns. When President Pompidou died the project was cancelled. But the point is, if the French could recognise the

178

THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION challenge, why cannot the Americans? No other Western government has the capability to make such a reassessment This analyst wishes to conclude with the request that, if something happens to him, this analysis and his suggestions should be treated as his political will and testa-ment. .. One can ignore the analysis and suggestions for a time but one will be forced by future developments to come back to them and start rethinking the unthinkable, though under less favourable conditions. The Communist challenge and threat will be the major preoccupation of US foreign policy for the years ahead'.
APPENDIX: 15 JANUARY 1978

175
Memorandum to the CIA: 15 J
ANUARY
1978

THE LONG-RANGE POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND INTENTIONS OF THE SOVIET LEADERS: AN ASSESSMENT OF AN OFFICIAL REPORT BY A SOVIET EMIGRE IN THE LIGHT OF THE COMMUNIST BLOC'S LONG-RANGE STRATEGY AND ITS DISINFORMATION OFFENSIVE
'At the time of the adoption of the long-range strategy in the period 1958 to 1960, there was strong internal opposition to the Soviet regime from dissatisfied workers, collective farmers, intellectuals, clergy, Ukrainian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Jewish nationalists etc. These oppositionists did not call themselves "dissidents" and nor did the KGB call them "dissidents". On the contrary, the KGB and the Party referred to them as "enemies of the regime."... The KGB was instructed to adopt new methods to deal with this opposi-tion, based on the experience of the GPU (the Soviet political police) under Dzerzhin-skiy in the 1920s... This entailed the creation of a false opposition in the USSR and other coun-tries. .. The current "dissident movement" is just such a false opposition designed and created by the KGB.... The main objectives which the Soviet rulers are trying to achieve through the "dissident movement" are as follows: (a)

To confuse, neutralise and dissolve the true internal political opposition in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; (b)

To prevent the West from reaching the genuine internal opposition in the USSR, by introducing to the West a false KGB-controlled opposition. This explains the easy access of the Western media to the alleged "dissidents"; (c)

To influence the foreign policy of the United States through the "dissi-dents' in the interests of the Communist long-range strategy and exploit this issue in the strategy's final phase '. '... Another significant disinformation theme is the alleged existence of "hidden liberals" in the Party establishment. For example, Aleksey Rumyantsev has been described as a liberal. In fact, he is a hardcore Communist who has always worked in the field of ideology. For a number of years after 1958 he was an editor of the interna-tional Communist journal 'Problems of Peace and Socialism'. Because of his position and experience, he was deeply involved in the devel-opment of the new strategy and deceptive tactics. This explains why he is now being misrepresented as a liberal. A similar case is that of an important official who served as a case officer concerned with the pene-tration of a leading Western intelligence service before, during and after the Second World War, who is now being misrepresented as a liberal in the Party establishment. The scale of disinformation on these lines may be expected to increase and new "defectors" may be expected to provide such disinformation '.

176

THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION '... This analyst has reached the following conclusions about probable devel-opments in the USSR: (a)

One can expect the introduction of economic reforms; which will have similarities to Yugoslav or even Western socialist practice.... (b)

Liberalisation of the Soviet regime on the lines of the Czechoslovak liber-alisation of 1968, including an apparent curtailing of the monopoly of the Communist Party, an apparent separation of the legislative, executive and judicial powers, an increased role for the Soviet parliament, 'reform' of the KGB, an amnesty for "dissi-dents", greater artistic and cultural freedom and freedom to travel, compliance with the Helsinki agreements and the emergence of a younger Party leader to initiate the reforms.... (c)

Similar reforms in Eastern Europe including the return of Dubcek in Czechoslovakia and perhaps the demolition of the Berlin Wall... (d)

The liberalisation will, however, be false and will be aimed at breaking up NATO and dismantling the US "military-industrial complex" in the first instance. The new liberal image will be exploited by East Germany politically and diplomati-cally against West Germany to establish their political confederation... (e)

The deceptive liberalisation will be accepted as genuine and spontaneous and will be blown up out of all proportion by the media... (f)

It may generate pressure for real detente and far-reaching changes in Western societies...'. '... The main objectives of the disinformation which is coming from Brezhnev and his Soviet policymakers are: (a)

To reconfirm for US policymakers the essence of the larger Communist disinformation theme that the Communist Bloc does not exist and that Communist ideology is dead; (b)

To conceal the existing secret coordination between the Communist states and Communist Parties in the non-Communist world in the implementation of their long-range strategy in its final phase; (c)

To reconfirm on this basis to US policymakers the correctness of the US detente with the USSR and the correctness of US support for the Soviet "dissidents" as the viable way to bring about the internal liberalisation of the Soviet regime; and, finally: (d)

To prepare US policymakers psychologically for a favourable response to the false liberalisation when it comes. Since this liberalisation in the USSR will be calculated, false and controlled, the conclusion can be drawn that the main purpose of the disinformation is to influ-ence the US response to the coming false liberalisation in the USSR in the interests of their long-range strategy in the final phase. The arrival of other high-level Soviet "defectors" or "official emigres" can be expected, armed with similar disinformation to influence US foreign policy along these lines'.

APPENDIX: 15 JANUARY 1978

177 '... Over the past fifteen years this analyst, in oral and written reports to the CIA and other Western services, has described various aspects of the Communist Bloc's long-range strategy, the new political role of the KGB and the role of disinfor-mation... The West and its scholars underestimate the gravity of the Communist threat which is more serious than after the Second World War when the United States had a nuclear near-monopoly... Communist ideology is alive again and the Communist world is on the political, economic and diplomatic offensive against the West in the framework of their long-range strategy... All means are used in the battle, legal and illegal; that is why they have resorted to the use of disinformation on an unusually large scale, which throws a completely new light on their detente, on their attempt to change the military balance in their favour and, which is most important of all, on their intentions..'. '... A crisis in US foreign policy has been building up since the adoption of the Communist Bloc's long-range strategy because of the West's inability to understand and interpret the true meaning of events in the Communist world. The crisis is hidden, unrecognised... Now the situation is complicated by the activist approach of the Carter Administration to diplomacy towards the USSR, China and Eastern Europe and in seeking solutions to existing conflicts on the basis of misconceptions. An attempt is being made to bring about liberalisation in the USSR without realising the existence of Communist strategy and disinformation and, for example, the falsity of the KGB-controlled "dissident movement"... In this way, a trap is being laid by the Communist policymakers which will be exploited when the USSR carries out a deceptive liberalisation of its regime...'. '... The problems associated with the new Communist tactics, of the political use of their intelligence potential, their agents of influence and their disinformation, have not been dealt with properly for the last eighteen years, and their priority has not been recognised. The US, British and French counter-intelligence services have been impaired by reorganisation and KGB penetration. Counter-intelligence has a key role to play in understanding and dealing with the new dimensions of the Communist threat, since this entails an analysis of US and other sources of information on Communist developments and of how they might have been compromised by penetration or otherwise exploited by the KGB for disinformation purposes... A special committee or group of qualified and reliable people should be set up by the US Government to study this problem. The project should be approved by the President and should be directly under him. The heads of the Senate Intelligence and Foreign Relations Committees, the Senate and House leaders of both parties and the Attorney General should be told and consulted about this project in advance... A confidential project along these lines was in preparation at this analyst's suggestion under the late French President Pompidou. President Pompidou was a scholar who had read Lenin's and Mao's works and Sun Tzu's treatise on 'The Art of War' which dealt with disinformation and its patterns. When President Pompidou died the project was cancelled. But the point is, if the French could recognise the

178

THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION challenge, why cannot the Americans? No other Western government has the capability to make such a reassessment This analyst wishes to conclude with the request that, if something happens to him, this analysis and his suggestions should be treated as his political will and testa-ment. .. One can ignore the analysis and suggestions for a time but one will be forced by future developments to come back to them and start rethinking the unthinkable, though under less favourable conditions. The Communist challenge and threat will be the major preoccupation of US foreign policy for the years ahead'.
APPENDIX: 15 JANUARY 1978

175
Memorandum to the CIA: 15 J
ANUARY
1978

THE LONG-RANGE POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND INTENTIONS OF THE SOVIET LEADERS: AN ASSESSMENT OF AN OFFICIAL REPORT BY A SOVIET EMIGRE IN THE LIGHT OF THE COMMUNIST BLOC'S LONG-RANGE STRATEGY AND ITS DISINFORMATION OFFENSIVE
'At the time of the adoption of the long-range strategy in the period 1958 to 1960, there was strong internal opposition to the Soviet regime from dissatisfied workers, collective farmers, intellectuals, clergy, Ukrainian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Jewish nationalists etc. These oppositionists did not call themselves "dissidents" and nor did the KGB call them "dissidents". On the contrary, the KGB and the Party referred to them as "enemies of the regime."... The KGB was instructed to adopt new methods to deal with this opposi-tion, based on the experience of the GPU (the Soviet political police) under Dzerzhin-skiy in the 1920s... This entailed the creation of a false opposition in the USSR and other coun-tries. .. The current "dissident movement" is just such a false opposition designed and created by the KGB.... The main objectives which the Soviet rulers are trying to achieve through the "dissident movement" are as follows: (a)

To confuse, neutralise and dissolve the true internal political opposition in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; (b)

To prevent the West from reaching the genuine internal opposition in the USSR, by introducing to the West a false KGB-controlled opposition. This explains the easy access of the Western media to the alleged "dissidents"; (c)

To influence the foreign policy of the United States through the "dissi-dents' in the interests of the Communist long-range strategy and exploit this issue in the strategy's final phase '. '... Another significant disinformation theme is the alleged existence of "hidden liberals" in the Party establishment. For example, Aleksey Rumyantsev has been described as a liberal. In fact, he is a hardcore Communist who has always worked in the field of ideology. For a number of years after 1958 he was an editor of the interna-tional Communist journal 'Problems of Peace and Socialism'. Because of his position and experience, he was deeply involved in the devel-opment of the new strategy and deceptive tactics. This explains why he is now being misrepresented as a liberal. A similar case is that of an important official who served as a case officer concerned with the pene-tration of a leading Western intelligence service before, during and after the Second World War, who is now being misrepresented as a liberal in the Party establishment. The scale of disinformation on these lines may be expected to increase and new "defectors" may be expected to provide such disinformation '.

176

THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION '... This analyst has reached the following conclusions about probable devel-opments in the USSR: (a)

One can expect the introduction of economic reforms; which will have similarities to Yugoslav or even Western socialist practice.... (b)

Liberalisation of the Soviet regime on the lines of the Czechoslovak liber-alisation of 1968, including an apparent curtailing of the monopoly of the Communist Party, an apparent separation of the legislative, executive and judicial powers, an increased role for the Soviet parliament, 'reform' of the KGB, an amnesty for "dissi-dents", greater artistic and cultural freedom and freedom to travel, compliance with the Helsinki agreements and the emergence of a younger Party leader to initiate the reforms.... (c)

Similar reforms in Eastern Europe including the return of Dubcek in Czechoslovakia and perhaps the demolition of the Berlin Wall... (d)

The liberalisation will, however, be false and will be aimed at breaking up NATO and dismantling the US "military-industrial complex" in the first instance. The new liberal image will be exploited by East Germany politically and diplomati-cally against West Germany to establish their political confederation... (e)

The deceptive liberalisation will be accepted as genuine and spontaneous and will be blown up out of all proportion by the media... (f)

It may generate pressure for real detente and far-reaching changes in Western societies...'. '... The main objectives of the disinformation which is coming from Brezhnev and his Soviet policymakers are: (a)

To reconfirm for US policymakers the essence of the larger Communist disinformation theme that the Communist Bloc does not exist and that Communist ideology is dead; (b)

To conceal the existing secret coordination between the Communist states and Communist Parties in the non-Communist world in the implementation of their long-range strategy in its final phase; (c)

To reconfirm on this basis to US policymakers the correctness of the US detente with the USSR and the correctness of US support for the Soviet "dissidents" as the viable way to bring about the internal liberalisation of the Soviet regime; and, finally: (d)

To prepare US policymakers psychologically for a favourable response to the false liberalisation when it comes. Since this liberalisation in the USSR will be calculated, false and controlled, the conclusion can be drawn that the main purpose of the disinformation is to influ-ence the US response to the coming false liberalisation in the USSR in the interests of their long-range strategy in the final phase. The arrival of other high-level Soviet "defectors" or "official emigres" can be expected, armed with similar disinformation to influence US foreign policy along these lines'.

APPENDIX: 15 JANUARY 1978

177 '... Over the past fifteen years this analyst, in oral and written reports to the CIA and other Western services, has described various aspects of the Communist Bloc's long-range strategy, the new political role of the KGB and the role of disinfor-mation... The West and its scholars underestimate the gravity of the Communist threat which is more serious than after the Second World War when the United States had a nuclear near-monopoly... Communist ideology is alive again and the Communist world is on the political, economic and diplomatic offensive against the West in the framework of their long-range strategy... All means are used in the battle, legal and illegal; that is why they have resorted to the use of disinformation on an unusually large scale, which throws a completely new light on their detente, on their attempt to change the military balance in their favour and, which is most important of all, on their intentions..'. '... A crisis in US foreign policy has been building up since the adoption of the Communist Bloc's long-range strategy because of the West's inability to understand and interpret the true meaning of events in the Communist world. The crisis is hidden, unrecognised... Now the situation is complicated by the activist approach of the Carter Administration to diplomacy towards the USSR, China and Eastern Europe and in seeking solutions to existing conflicts on the basis of misconceptions. An attempt is being made to bring about liberalisation in the USSR without realising the existence of Communist strategy and disinformation and, for example, the falsity of the KGB-controlled "dissident movement"... In this way, a trap is being laid by the Communist policymakers which will be exploited when the USSR carries out a deceptive liberalisation of its regime...'. '... The problems associated with the new Communist tactics, of the political use of their intelligence potential, their agents of influence and their disinformation, have not been dealt with properly for the last eighteen years, and their priority has not been recognised. The US, British and French counter-intelligence services have been impaired by reorganisation and KGB penetration. Counter-intelligence has a key role to play in understanding and dealing with the new dimensions of the Communist threat, since this entails an analysis of US and other sources of information on Communist developments and of how they might have been compromised by penetration or otherwise exploited by the KGB for disinformation purposes... A special committee or group of qualified and reliable people should be set up by the US Government to study this problem. The project should be approved by the President and should be directly under him. The heads of the Senate Intelligence and Foreign Relations Committees, the Senate and House leaders of both parties and the Attorney General should be told and consulted about this project in advance... A confidential project along these lines was in preparation at this analyst's suggestion under the late French President Pompidou. President Pompidou was a scholar who had read Lenin's and Mao's works and Sun Tzu's treatise on 'The Art of War' which dealt with disinformation and its patterns. When President Pompidou died the project was cancelled. But the point is, if the French could recognise the

178

THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION challenge, why cannot the Americans? No other Western government has the capability to make such a reassessment This analyst wishes to conclude with the request that, if something happens to him, this analysis and his suggestions should be treated as his political will and testa-ment. .. One can ignore the analysis and suggestions for a time but one will be forced by future developments to come back to them and start rethinking the unthinkable, though under less favourable conditions. The Communist challenge and threat will be the major preoccupation of US foreign policy for the years ahead'.
APPENDIX: 15 JANUARY 1978

175
Memorandum to the CIA: 15 J
ANUARY
1978

THE LONG-RANGE POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND INTENTIONS OF THE SOVIET LEADERS: AN ASSESSMENT OF AN OFFICIAL REPORT BY A SOVIET EMIGRE IN THE LIGHT OF THE COMMUNIST BLOC'S LONG-RANGE STRATEGY AND ITS DISINFORMATION OFFENSIVE
'At the time of the adoption of the long-range strategy in the period 1958 to 1960, there was strong internal opposition to the Soviet regime from dissatisfied workers, collective farmers, intellectuals, clergy, Ukrainian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Jewish nationalists etc. These oppositionists did not call themselves "dissidents" and nor did the KGB call them "dissidents". On the contrary, the KGB and the Party referred to them as "enemies of the regime."... The KGB was instructed to adopt new methods to deal with this opposi-tion, based on the experience of the GPU (the Soviet political police) under Dzerzhin-skiy in the 1920s... This entailed the creation of a false opposition in the USSR and other coun-tries. .. The current "dissident movement" is just such a false opposition designed and created by the KGB.... The main objectives which the Soviet rulers are trying to achieve through the "dissident movement" are as follows: (a)

To confuse, neutralise and dissolve the true internal political opposition in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; (b)

To prevent the West from reaching the genuine internal opposition in the USSR, by introducing to the West a false KGB-controlled opposition. This explains the easy access of the Western media to the alleged "dissidents"; (c)

To influence the foreign policy of the United States through the "dissi-dents' in the interests of the Communist long-range strategy and exploit this issue in the strategy's final phase '. '... Another significant disinformation theme is the alleged existence of "hidden liberals" in the Party establishment. For example, Aleksey Rumyantsev has been described as a liberal. In fact, he is a hardcore Communist who has always worked in the field of ideology. For a number of years after 1958 he was an editor of the interna-tional Communist journal 'Problems of Peace and Socialism'. Because of his position and experience, he was deeply involved in the devel-opment of the new strategy and deceptive tactics. This explains why he is now being misrepresented as a liberal. A similar case is that of an important official who served as a case officer concerned with the pene-tration of a leading Western intelligence service before, during and after the Second World War, who is now being misrepresented as a liberal in the Party establishment. The scale of disinformation on these lines may be expected to increase and new "defectors" may be expected to provide such disinformation '.

176

THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION '... This analyst has reached the following conclusions about probable devel-opments in the USSR: (a)

One can expect the introduction of economic reforms; which will have similarities to Yugoslav or even Western socialist practice.... (b)

Liberalisation of the Soviet regime on the lines of the Czechoslovak liber-alisation of 1968, including an apparent curtailing of the monopoly of the Communist Party, an apparent separation of the legislative, executive and judicial powers, an increased role for the Soviet parliament, 'reform' of the KGB, an amnesty for "dissi-dents", greater artistic and cultural freedom and freedom to travel, compliance with the Helsinki agreements and the emergence of a younger Party leader to initiate the reforms.... (c)

Similar reforms in Eastern Europe including the return of Dubcek in Czechoslovakia and perhaps the demolition of the Berlin Wall... (d)

The liberalisation will, however, be false and will be aimed at breaking up NATO and dismantling the US "military-industrial complex" in the first instance. The new liberal image will be exploited by East Germany politically and diplomati-cally against West Germany to establish their political confederation... (e)

The deceptive liberalisation will be accepted as genuine and spontaneous and will be blown up out of all proportion by the media... (f)

It may generate pressure for real detente and far-reaching changes in Western societies...'. '... The main objectives of the disinformation which is coming from Brezhnev and his Soviet policymakers are: (a)

To reconfirm for US policymakers the essence of the larger Communist disinformation theme that the Communist Bloc does not exist and that Communist ideology is dead; (b)

To conceal the existing secret coordination between the Communist states and Communist Parties in the non-Communist world in the implementation of their long-range strategy in its final phase; (c)

To reconfirm on this basis to US policymakers the correctness of the US detente with the USSR and the correctness of US support for the Soviet "dissidents" as the viable way to bring about the internal liberalisation of the Soviet regime; and, finally: (d)

To prepare US policymakers psychologically for a favourable response to the false liberalisation when it comes. Since this liberalisation in the USSR will be calculated, false and controlled, the conclusion can be drawn that the main purpose of the disinformation is to influ-ence the US response to the coming false liberalisation in the USSR in the interests of their long-range strategy in the final phase. The arrival of other high-level Soviet "defectors" or "official emigres" can be expected, armed with similar disinformation to influence US foreign policy along these lines'.

APPENDIX: 15 JANUARY 1978

177 '... Over the past fifteen years this analyst, in oral and written reports to the CIA and other Western services, has described various aspects of the Communist Bloc's long-range strategy, the new political role of the KGB and the role of disinfor-mation... The West and its scholars underestimate the gravity of the Communist threat which is more serious than after the Second World War when the United States had a nuclear near-monopoly... Communist ideology is alive again and the Communist world is on the political, economic and diplomatic offensive against the West in the framework of their long-range strategy... All means are used in the battle, legal and illegal; that is why they have resorted to the use of disinformation on an unusually large scale, which throws a completely new light on their detente, on their attempt to change the military balance in their favour and, which is most important of all, on their intentions..'. '... A crisis in US foreign policy has been building up since the adoption of the Communist Bloc's long-range strategy because of the West's inability to understand and interpret the true meaning of events in the Communist world. The crisis is hidden, unrecognised... Now the situation is complicated by the activist approach of the Carter Administration to diplomacy towards the USSR, China and Eastern Europe and in seeking solutions to existing conflicts on the basis of misconceptions. An attempt is being made to bring about liberalisation in the USSR without realising the existence of Communist strategy and disinformation and, for example, the falsity of the KGB-controlled "dissident movement"... In this way, a trap is being laid by the Communist policymakers which will be exploited when the USSR carries out a deceptive liberalisation of its regime...'. '... The problems associated with the new Communist tactics, of the political use of their intelligence potential, their agents of influence and their disinformation, have not been dealt with properly for the last eighteen years, and their priority has not been recognised. The US, British and French counter-intelligence services have been impaired by reorganisation and KGB penetration. Counter-intelligence has a key role to play in understanding and dealing with the new dimensions of the Communist threat, since this entails an analysis of US and other sources of information on Communist developments and of how they might have been compromised by penetration or otherwise exploited by the KGB for disinformation purposes... A special committee or group of qualified and reliable people should be set up by the US Government to study this problem. The project should be approved by the President and should be directly under him. The heads of the Senate Intelligence and Foreign Relations Committees, the Senate and House leaders of both parties and the Attorney General should be told and consulted about this project in advance... A confidential project along these lines was in preparation at this analyst's suggestion under the late French President Pompidou. President Pompidou was a scholar who had read Lenin's and Mao's works and Sun Tzu's treatise on 'The Art of War' which dealt with disinformation and its patterns. When President Pompidou died the project was cancelled. But the point is, if the French could recognise the

178

THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION challenge, why cannot the Americans? No other Western government has the capability to make such a reassessment This analyst wishes to conclude with the request that, if something happens to him, this analysis and his suggestions should be treated as his political will and testa-ment. .. One can ignore the analysis and suggestions for a time but one will be forced by future developments to come back to them and start rethinking the unthinkable, though under less favourable conditions. The Communist challenge and threat will be the major preoccupation of US foreign policy for the years ahead'.
APPENDIX: 15 JANUARY 1978

175
Memorandum to the CIA: 15 J
ANUARY
1978

THE LONG-RANGE POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND INTENTIONS OF THE SOVIET LEADERS: AN ASSESSMENT OF AN OFFICIAL REPORT BY A SOVIET EMIGRE IN THE LIGHT OF THE COMMUNIST BLOC'S LONG-RANGE STRATEGY AND ITS DISINFORMATION OFFENSIVE
'At the time of the adoption of the long-range strategy in the period 1958 to 1960, there was strong internal opposition to the Soviet regime from dissatisfied workers, collective farmers, intellectuals, clergy, Ukrainian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Jewish nationalists etc. These oppositionists did not call themselves "dissidents" and nor did the KGB call them "dissidents". On the contrary, the KGB and the Party referred to them as "enemies of the regime."... The KGB was instructed to adopt new methods to deal with this opposi-tion, based on the experience of the GPU (the Soviet political police) under Dzerzhin-skiy in the 1920s... This entailed the creation of a false opposition in the USSR and other coun-tries. .. The current "dissident movement" is just such a false opposition designed and created by the KGB.... The main objectives which the Soviet rulers are trying to achieve through the "dissident movement" are as follows: (a)

To confuse, neutralise and dissolve the true internal political opposition in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; (b)

To prevent the West from reaching the genuine internal opposition in the USSR, by introducing to the West a false KGB-controlled opposition. This explains the easy access of the Western media to the alleged "dissidents"; (c)

To influence the foreign policy of the United States through the "dissi-dents' in the interests of the Communist long-range strategy and exploit this issue in the strategy's final phase '. '... Another significant disinformation theme is the alleged existence of "hidden liberals" in the Party establishment. For example, Aleksey Rumyantsev has been described as a liberal. In fact, he is a hardcore Communist who has always worked in the field of ideology. For a number of years after 1958 he was an editor of the interna-tional Communist journal 'Problems of Peace and Socialism'. Because of his position and experience, he was deeply involved in the devel-opment of the new strategy and deceptive tactics. This explains why he is now being misrepresented as a liberal. A similar case is that of an important official who served as a case officer concerned with the pene-tration of a leading Western intelligence service before, during and after the Second World War, who is now being misrepresented as a liberal in the Party establishment. The scale of disinformation on these lines may be expected to increase and new "defectors" may be expected to provide such disinformation '.

176

THE PERESTROIKA DECEPTION '... This analyst has reached the following conclusions about probable devel-opments in the USSR: (a)

One can expect the introduction of economic reforms; which will have similarities to Yugoslav or even Western socialist practice.... (b)

Liberalisation of the Soviet regime on the lines of the Czechoslovak liber-alisation of 1968, including an apparent curtailing of the monopoly of the Communist Party, an apparent separation of the legislative, executive and judicial powers, an increased role for the Soviet parliament, 'reform' of the KGB, an amnesty for "dissi-dents", greater artistic and cultural freedom and freedom to travel, compliance with the Helsinki agreements and the emergence of a younger Party leader to initiate the reforms.... (c)

Similar reforms in Eastern Europe including the return of Dubcek in Czechoslovakia and perhaps the demolition of the Berlin Wall... (d)

The liberalisation will, however, be false and will be aimed at breaking up NATO and dismantling the US "military-industrial complex" in the first instance. The new liberal image will be exploited by East Germany politically and diplomati-cally against West Germany to establish their political confederation... (e)

The deceptive liberalisation will be accepted as genuine and spontaneous and will be blown up out of all proportion by the media... (f)

It may generate pressure for real detente and far-reaching changes in Western societies...'. '... The main objectives of the disinformation which is coming from Brezhnev and his Soviet policymakers are: (a)

To reconfirm for US policymakers the essence of the larger Communist disinformation theme that the Communist Bloc does not exist and that Communist ideology is dead; (b)

To conceal the existing secret coordination between the Communist states and Communist Parties in the non-Communist world in the implementation of their long-range strategy in its final phase; (c)

To reconfirm on this basis to US policymakers the correctness of the US detente with the USSR and the correctness of US support for the Soviet "dissidents" as the viable way to bring about the internal liberalisation of the Soviet regime; and, finally: (d)

To prepare US policymakers psychologically for a favourable response to the false liberalisation when it comes. Since this liberalisation in the USSR will be calculated, false and controlled, the conclusion can be drawn that the main purpose of the disinformation is to influ-ence the US response to the coming false liberalisation in the USSR in the interests of their long-range strategy in the final phase. The arrival of other high-level Soviet "defectors" or "official emigres" can be expected, armed with similar disinformation to influence US foreign policy along these lines'.

APPENDIX: 15 JANUARY 1978

177 '... Over the past fifteen years this analyst, in oral and written reports to the CIA and other Western services, has described various aspects of the Communist Bloc's long-range strategy, the new political role of the KGB and the role of disinfor-mation... The West and its scholars underestimate the gravity of the Communist threat which is more serious than after the Second World War when the United States had a nuclear near-monopoly... Communist ideology is alive again and the Communist world is on the political, economic and diplomatic offensive against the West in the framework of their long-range strategy... All means are used in the battle, legal and illegal; that is why they have resorted to the use of disinformation on an unusually large scale, which throws a completely new light on their detente, on their attempt to change the military balance in their favour and, which is most important of all, on their intentions..'. '... A crisis in US foreign policy has been building up since the adoption of the Communist Bloc's long-range strategy because of the West's inability to understand and interpret the true meaning of events in the Communist world. The crisis is hidden, unrecognised... Now the situation is complicated by the activist approach of the Carter Administration to diplomacy towards the USSR, China and Eastern Europe and in seeking solutions to existing conflicts on the basis of misconceptions. An attempt is being made to bring about liberalisation in the USSR without realising the existence of Communist strategy and disinformation and, for example, the falsity of the KGB-controlled "dissident movement"... In this way, a trap is being laid by the Communist policymakers which will be exploited when the USSR carries out a deceptive liberalisation of its regime...'. '... The problems associated with the new Communist tactics, of the political use of their intelligence potential, their

Can't stop a cheap NHL owner by talking about him on a hockey site, but you can stop a global conspiracy by posting walls of text nobody will read.
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